

2nd Annual SoCal Philosophy Conference in San Diego

in three divisions:

- Faculty/Peer Division --**
- Graduate Student Division --**
- Undergraduate Student Division --**

Conrad Prebys Student Union Building, SDSU

Saturday & Sunday, 18-19 October 2014

PROGRAM

Sponsored by SDSU Associated Students, the Institute for Ethics and Public Affairs, and the Charles Wei-hsun Fu Foundation.

-- Faculty/Peer Division --

Saturday
18 October 2014

*Philosophy and Fiction; Competition
and Cooperation*

Moderator: Sandra Wawrytko

- 01** 0800 / Legacy Suite
Tomás Bogardus (Pepperdine)
*Why Non-Reductive Physicalists
Should Backtrack*
Moderator: Harriet Baber
- 02** 0900 / Legacy Suite
Sandra Wawrytko (SDSU)
*Fox Philosophy: From Introspection
to Awareness*
Moderator: Todd Jones
- 03** 1000 / Legacy Suite
Daniel Schwartz (UCSD)
*Francis Bacon on the Certainty and
Deceptiveness of Sense Perception*
Moderator: Rebeka Ferreira
- 04** 1100 / Legacy Suite
Rebeka Ferreira (Oregon Tech)
*A Defense of Externalism about
Lower-Order Epistemic Justification*
Moderator: Michael Goerger

- 07** 1400 / Legacy Suite
M. Tiboris and S. Danforth (SDSU)
*Learning to Occupy Yourself: The
Substantive Content of Educating for
Autonomy*
Moderator: Bob Dunton

- 08** 1500 / Legacy Suite
Bob Dunton (Corbett Charter School,
Oregon)
*Exploring the Adequacy of Kieran
Egan's Theory of Imaginative
Education to Address the
Contradictions Embedded in
Contemporary American Educational
Landscape*
Moderator: M. Tiboris & S. Danforth

- 09** 1600 / Legacy Suite
Harriet Baber (USD)
Trinity, Generality, and Dominance
Moderator: Tomás Bogardus

- 10** 1600 / Visionary Suite
Michael Goerger (C. Washington U.)
Virtue as Valuing
Moderator: Daniel Schwartz

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- 05** 1200 / Theatre
Alice Crary (New School for Social
Research)
*Feminism, Ethics and the
Underrepresentation of Women in
Philosophy*

Keynote Address for SDSU's 3rd Annual
Undergraduate Philosophy Conference –
Feminist Philosophy

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- 11** 1700 / Theatre
Keynote Address
Kenneth Taylor (Stanford)
Selfhood as Self-Representation
-

- 06** 1300 / Legacy Suite
Todd Jones (UNLV)

-- Graduate Student Division --

Saturday

18 October 2014

- 12 0800 / Visionary Suite
Renee Bolinger (USC)
Revisiting the Right to Do Wrong
Moderator: Eugene Chislenko
- 13 0800 / Tehuanco
Ryan Ausperk (Kent State U.)
Flesh and Society: Merleau-Ponty and the Possibility of an Intersubjective Political Regime
Moderator: Christian Weede
- 14 0800 / State Suite
Marco P. Camacho (U. Kansas)
Measuring Perfections: A Problem for Perfectionism
Moderator: Matthew Leonard
- 15 0900 / Visionary Suite
Alysha Kassam (CSU Los Angeles)
Anarchism: An Incomplete and Confused View
Moderator: Kevin Watson
- 16 0900 / Tehuanco
George Schieck (SDSU)
Spinoza and 'Blessedness'
Moderator: Colten Steele
- 17 0900 / State Suite
Christian Weede (CSU Long Beach)
Grounds for Divorce from Presentism
Moderator: Megan Stotts
- 18 1000 / Visionary Suite
Nathaniel Greely (CSU Los Angeles)
Phenomenal Intentionality and the
- Extended Mind Meet Again*
Moderator: Nanhee Byrnes
- 19 1000 / Tehuanco
Colten Steele (U. Hawaii)
Wholly Spinoza! Or Why It Is Good To Feel Good: A Case For Why Pleasure Is Wholesome in Spinoza's Philosophy
Moderator: George Schieck
- 20 1000 / State Suite
Mark Eberle (Arizona State U.)
Qualia Functionalism
Moderator: Jaryth Webber
- 21 1100 / Visionary Suite
Natalia Karablina (SUNY Albany)
War and Justice in Plato's The Republic
Moderator: Ryan Ausperk
- 22 1100 / Tehuanco
David Beglin (UC Riverside)
Blame as Protest and the Moral Competence Requirement
Moderator: Alysha Kassam
- 23 1100 / State Suite
Nanhee Byrnes (UCSD)
The Democracy Dualists' Conjecture
Moderator: Taylor Cyr
-
- 24 1200 / Theatre
Alice Crary (New School for Social Research)
Feminism, Ethics and the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy
Keynote Address for SDSU's 3rd Annual Undergraduate Philosophy Conference – Feminist Philosophy
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- 25 1300 / Visionary Suite
Andrew Lavin (UCLA)
Mapping Perception
Moderator: Michael Fitzpatrick
- 26 1300 / Tehuanco
Taylor Cyr / (UC Riverside)
Ockhamism and Backward Causation
Moderator: Mark Eberle
- 27 1300 / State Suite
Zak Kopeikin (U. Colorado-Boulder)
Ronald Dworkin's "Hard Cases:" Advance Directives, Uncertainty, and Life-Saving Treatment
Moderator: Brandon Rickabaugh
- 28 1400 / Visionary Suite
Michael Fitzpatrick (Stanford)
Badiou's Paradox of Politics and Aesthetics
Moderator: Andrew Lavin
- 29 1400 / Tehuanco
Matthew Leonard (USC)
Mereological Harmony and Substantialism
Moderator: Marco P. Camacho
- 30 1400 / State Suite
Brandon Rickabaugh (Biola U.)
Grounding & Personal Identity: An Enduring Problem for Animalism
Moderator: Zak Kopeikin
- 31 1500 / Visionary Suite
Eugene Chislenko (Berkeley)
The Ethics of Willpower
Moderator: Renee Bolinger
- 32 1500 / Tehuanco
Megan Stotts (UC Riverside)
The Foundations of Expression Meaning
Moderator: Nathaniel Greely

- 33 1500 / State Suite
Rick Stoodly (UCSB)
In Defense of Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Examples
Moderator: David Beglin
- 34 1600 / Tehuanco
Jaryth Webber (U. Texas-Arlington)
Selection and Exaptation: An Essay in Philosophical Biology, Representation, and Culture
Moderator: Rick Stoodly
- 35 1600 / State Suite
Kevin Watson (CSU Long Beach)
Tracing and Offloading: A Neo-Lockean Reply to Johnston
Moderator: Natalia Karablina

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- 36 1700 / Theatre
Keynote Address
Kenneth Taylor (Stanford)
Selfhood as Self-Representation
-

Sunday

19 October 2014

- 37 0800 / Visionary Suite
Anthony Ferrucci (U. Washington)
On Thought Experiments and Idealization
Moderator: Yu Nakahiro
- 38 0800 / Tehuanco
Christopher Bobier (UC Irvine)
Locke on a Government's Right to Punish Foreigners
Moderator: Sherri Lynn Conklin
- 39 0900 / Visionary Suite
Alexander Kaiserman (Oxford &

- Princeton)
Causes and Counterparts
Moderator: Ben Sheredos
- 40** 0900 / Tehuanco
Douglas Campbell (U. Toronto)
Al-Fārābī and Plato on Common Knowledge in the Ideal City
Moderator: Tyler Olsson
- 41** 1000 / Visionary Suite
Yu Nakahiro (New School, NYC)
Redemption of Here-and-Now – on Benjamin’s Historical Materialism
Moderator: Douglas Campbell
- 42** 1000 / State Suite
Elis Miller (U. New Mexico)
Empirical Erkenntnis in the first Critique
Moderator: Corey McGrath
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- 43** 1100 / Theatre
Michael Devitt (CUNY)
Testing Theories of Reference
Keynote Address for SDSU’s 4th Annual
Weber Graduate Philosophy Conference –
Philosophy of Language
-
- 44** 1200 / Visionary Suite
Tyler Olsson (San Francisco State U.)
The Ontological Primacy of Reflexivity: Using Heidegger’s Call of Conscience to Ground Absorbed Normativity
Moderator: Elis Miller
- 45** 1200 / Tehuanco
Sherri L. Conklin (UCSB)
Intentional Actions and Unintentional Outcomes: Problems for Praise-Blame Asymmetry
Moderator: Alex Kaiserman

- 46** 1300 / Visionary Suite
Tim Sparks (Temple U.)
Democracy, the Environment, and Love
Moderator: Travis Timmerman
- 47** 1300 / Tehuanco
Ben Sheredos (UCSD)
A Plea for Recognizing Graphical Vagueness
Moderator: Anthony Ferrucci
- 48** 1300 / State Suite
Corey McGrath (UCSB)
Color Relationalism and Perceptual Error
Moderator: Jonathan Shoemaker
- 49** 1400 / Visionary Suite
Travis Timmerman (Syracuse)
Sometimes There is Nothing Wrong with Letting a Child Drown
Moderator: Christopher Bobier
- 50** 1400 / Tehuanco
Jonathan Shoemaker (UC Irvine)
False Second-Order Beliefs and Socrates’ Denial of ‘Akrasia’
Moderator: Tim Sparks
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- 51** 1500 / Theatre
Keynote Address
John Fischer (UC Riverside)
Libertarianism and the Problem of Metaphysical Flipflopping
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-- Undergraduate Student Division --

Saturday

18 October 2014

52 0800 / Presidential Suite
Chandler Rogers (Biola U.)
The Faithless Author(s) of Fear and Trembling: Kierkegaard and de Silentio in Perspective
Moderator: James Johnson

53 0900 / Presidential Suite
James Johnson (UCLA)
Francisco Suarez: Concurrentism and Sinful Acts
Moderator: Anna Brinkerhoff

54 1000 / Presidential Suite
Heather Stewart (U. Louisville)
Caring for the Monster: Analysis of the Emotional Investment in the Character Norman Bates
Moderator: Ryan Scheuring

55 1100 / Presidential Suite
Anna Brinkerhoff (Pepperdine)
The Hart-Dworkin Debate: Legal Positivism and Theoretical Disagreements
Moderator: Garry Soronio

56 1200 / Theatre
Alice Crary (New School for Social Research)
Feminism, Ethics and the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy

Keynote Address for SDSU's 3rd Annual Undergraduate Philosophy Conference – Feminist Philosophy

57 1300 / Presidential Suite
J. Johnson & G. Soronio (UCLA)
Is Divine Simplicity Compatible with Divine Contingent Knowledge?
Moderator: Chandler Rogers

58 1400 / Presidential Suite
Paige Massey (Pepperdine)
Art Appreciation
Moderator: Heather Stewart

59 1500 / Presidential Suite
Ryan Scheuring (Chapman U.)
A Rejection of the Metacoherence Requirement
Moderator: Paige Massey

60 1600 / Presidential Suite
Garry Soronio (UCLA)
Francisco Suárez's Defense for Substantial Form and Bid for the Reification of Matter
Moderator: James Johnson

61 1500 / Theatre
Keynote Address
Kenneth Taylor (Stanford)
Selfhood as Self-Representation

Sunday

19 October 2014

62 0900 / Presidential Suite
Cheryl Frazier (Barry U.)
The Pleasure of Pain: Why We Choose to Engage with Tragic Works

of Fiction

Moderator: Kari Hanson

- 63** 1000 / Presidential Suite
Kari Hanson (U. Minnesota-Morris)
The “Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument” as Presented by Colyvan: Logical Form and the Role of Naturalism
Moderator: Cheryl Frazier

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- 64** 1100 / Theatre
Michael Devitt (CUNY)
Testing Theories of Reference
Keynote Address for SDSU’s 4th Annual
Weber Graduate Philosophy Conference –
Philosophy of Language

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- 65** 1200 / Presidential Suite
Cameron Davis (Johns Hopkins)
Human Rights and Moral Antirealism
Moderator: James Johnson

- 66** 1300 / Presidential Suite
Garry Soronio (UCLA)
Albert Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity: The Denial of Absolute Simultaneity as a Challenge to Presentism
Moderator: Cameron Davis

- 67** 1400 / Presidential Suite
James Johnson (UCLA)
Leibniz’s Monads: Was He Consistent?
Moderator: Garry Soronio

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- 68** 1500 / Theatre
Keynote Address
John Fischer (UC Riverside)
Libertarianism and the Problem of Metaphysical Flipflopping
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ABSTRACTS:

Faculty/Peer Division:

01 Tomás Bogardus (Pepperdine)

Why Non-Reductive Physicalists Should Backtrack

Intuitively, if an effect has two simultaneous sufficient causes, it is overdetermined. And many philosophers find it implausible that ordinary cases of mental causation should regularly involve overdetermination. Yet many of those same philosophers—namely, the non-reductive physicalists—believe *both* that the mental does not reduce to the physical *and* that the mental and the physical are each causally efficacious. To avoid overdetermination, non-reductive physicalists deny our intuitive understanding mentioned above and insist on further counterfactual necessary conditions on overdetermination, conditions they claim are not met in ordinary cases of mental causation. Karen Bennett has provided the most sophisticated attempt at such a project, and I examine her proposal in detail. Unfortunately for non-reductive physicalism, her proposed conditions on overdetermination are vulnerable to refutation by counterexample. I close by considering the grim implications for physicalism generally

02 Sandra Wawrytko (SDSU)

Fox Philosophy: From Introspection to Awareness

My 2013 presentation, “Why Metaphysics is for Hedgehogs and Epistemology is for Foxes,” categorized philosophical metacognition using images representing levels of epistemological engagement, giving special focus to the Hedgehog and the Fox. Hedgehog philosophers have Great Faith in Big Ideas and Certainty. They rely on self-obsessed Introspection as they seek to uncover hard-wired components of law and

order that evolve into metaphysics, driven by left brain hypertrophy that fixates on abstract thought and is addicted to logocentrism. Fox philosophers question both Big Ideas and Certainty. Searching distant horizons, they engage in epistemological investigations of cognitive tools while remaining open to fresh perspectives. As Awareness replaces inward-turning Introspection, deconstructed thinking employs imagery that fosters right brain “betweenness.” Fox philosophers such as Śākyamuni Buddha, Benedict De Spinoza, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zhuang Zi, George Orwell, and George Carlin demonstrate how philosophy can be revitalized epistemologically. The insights of Jiddu Krishnamurti will be emphasized.

03 Daniel Schwartz (UCSD)

Francis Bacon on the Certainty and Deceptiveness of Sense Perception

There is an important tension within Francis Bacon’s discussions of sense-perception. On the one hand, he is clear that “all Interpretation of Nature starts from sense.” He is also critical of skeptics for undermining the certainty of sense-perception, and his criticisms make little sense unless he regards sense-perception as certain. On the other hand, he refers to errors, faults, desertions, and deceptions of the senses. My contention in this paper is that it is by adhering to an Epicurean account of the senses that Bacon can recognize these faults while still justifiably regarding sense-perception as a reliable foundation for natural history.

04 Rebeka Ferreira (Oregon Tech)

A Defense of Externalism about Lower-Order Epistemic Justification

Given that two agents both possess the same true belief for the same reason(s), does the fact that only one of them can access those reasons mean that they are justified while the other is not? This paper examines two accounts of

epistemic justification which attempt to respond to this question: Alvin Goldman's defense of externalism which requires the reliability of an agent's belief-producing cognitive processes; and Matthias Steup's proposal of internalism which requires an agent to be able to recognize, or have access to, their own justification upon reflection. After considering the advantages of and difficulties facing each, I propose a solution to the internalism v. externalism debate concerning epistemic justification by proposing that we accept an externalist understanding of lower-order justification in believing that p , while requiring an internalist access condition for higher-order justification that you are justified in believing that p .

05 Alice Crary (New School, NYC)

Keynote Address for SDSU Undergraduate Feminist Conference

Feminism, Ethics and the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy

This talk is about demands of feminist thought, and it is also about the notable underrepresentation of women in philosophy. I start by arguing that two prominent strands of feminist theorizing – strands associated, respectively, with poststructuralist thought and analytic moral philosophy – deprive us of resources for doing justice to feminist thinking insofar as it places certain demands on the imagination. I then claim that one place to find resources for a more satisfactory conception of feminist thinking is in Wittgenstein's and Austin's observations about the workings of language. My goal in turning to the writings of these figures is to show that their work equips us to arrive at an understanding of feminist thought that sheds helpful light on feminist praxis. One of my specific ambitions is to show that this new understanding equips us to take a step toward accounting for the underrepresentation of women in philosophy.

06 Todd Jones (UNLV)

Philosophy and Fiction; Competition and Cooperation

The study of fiction and the study of philosophy examine many of the same questions, and often compete for university resources. Here, I argue that each discipline is good at tasks that the other is not. Fiction is often justified as generating knowledge of the human condition. I argue here that it is not actually able to do so. At the same time, abstract general questions looked at in philosophy classes are often not ones students have a prior interest in. But they can be induced to be interested in them when (fictional) people that readers have come to care about end up in situations where these issues are raised. I argue that each discipline is more effective when they make heavy use of the other.

07 Michael Tiboris and Scott Danforth (SDSU)

Learning to Occupy Yourself: The Substantive Content of Educating for Autonomy

Philosophers of education have argued forcefully that helping students to become self-directed autonomous adults is among the most important aims of education. The emphasis in "educating for autonomy" has largely been concerned with procedural intellectual skills at analyzing, understanding, and criticizing one's own motivational structure. Philosophers of education have adopted this view of autonomy from contemporary work in agency by authors writing in the tradition of Harry Frankfurt. We argue, however, that the best views of educating for autonomy are committed to a much more substantive theory of autonomy that is developmental, action-oriented, and social. In defending this idea we draw some resources from John Dewey's reflections on

the aims of his "lab school"—in particular his emphasis on teaching students what he called the "occupations," which included learning about the history and practice of things like construction, cooking, and textile production. Reflecting on the substantive content of autonomy and recent work by philosophers concerned with the relational elements of individual autonomy, we argue that "educating for autonomy" requires teaching students to adopt some substantive beliefs about the social world in which they live, as well as a degree of actual success in making their occupations work for themselves and others.

08 Bob Dunton (Director, Corbett Charter School, Oregon)

Exploring the Adequacy of Kieran Egan's Theory of Imaginative Education to Address the Contradictions Embedded in Contemporary American Educational Landscape

Every culture renews itself through the intentional assimilation of its children. Through a rich variety of rites of passage, children, with greater and lesser degrees of pomp, take up the task of inhabiting the adult forms of life that characterize their parents' world.

Those responsible for preparing children for and introducing them to the knowledge and traditions of their ancestors believe that the children have both an obligation and a right to participate in their cultural birthright. For eons these rites and teachings were delivered innocently, without reflection, in the certain knowledge that the adults knew what they were about and that the children would play their assigned role. That we no longer occupy this particular garden is the root of one of our great cultural quandaries. The result is that from classroom to classroom we educate at cross-purposes to ourselves. We educate for autonomy at the expense of socialization. We educate for relevance at the potential cost of

rigor. We pass on tradition at the risk of alienation.

Kieran Egan makes a convincing case that Western theorists have conceptualized education in three fundamental ways and that the goals and purposes of each are in debilitating tension with both of the others. Proponents of the competing visions of education play a zero-sum game with regard to the allocation of any particular dollar or hour of the school day. His response to the resultant conundrum is a proposal that takes into account the competing interests but recasts the educational enterprise in a powerful new way.

I will evaluate his proposal from the perspective of a veteran teacher, administrator and school designer.

09 Harriet Baber (USD)

Trinity, Generality, and Dominance

Christians maintain that God is a Trinity of distinct Persons, each of which *is* God. Arguably, this Trinity doctrine is logically incoherent—unless the relation of each of the Persons to God the Trinity is something other than strict identity. According to Peter van Inwagen the relations that the Persons bear to one another to God are sortal relative identity relations: Father, Son and Holy Spirit are the *same being* but not the *same Person*; each is the *same being* as God but no Person is strictly identical to God.

I argue that this account of the Trinity doctrine withstands the objections of Michael Rea, which have propagated through the literature without critical scrutiny, licenses the inferences we want and while avoiding those that are incoherent or theologically objectionable. Van Inwagen's defense of the Trinity doctrine is of logical as well as theological interest insofar as it informally demonstrates the consistency of relative identity with first order logic.

10 Michael Goerger (C. Washington U.)

Virtue as Valuing

I argue for the deceptively simple claim that the virtues are ways of valuing. Virtue ethics explains morality primarily in terms of an agent's virtue as demonstrated in her actions. It thus demands a particularly strong connection between action and agent. In order to articulate that connection I draw on work in moral psychology, particularly that of Harry Frankfurt. Because values structure the will of the agent and give her reasons to act in certain ways, an agent's values connect her to her actions in a way that allows evaluative judgments of the agent. Thus, values are particularly important to our understanding of virtue. I end by considering three areas in which the account of virtue as valuing is particularly productive. Overall the account retains key components of Greco-Roman ethical theory while connecting the theory with key issues in contemporary moral philosophy.

11 Kenneth Taylor (Stanford)

Keynote Address

Selfhood as Self-Representation

Abstract

Graduate Student Division:

12 Renee Bolinger (USC)

Revisiting the Right to Do Wrong

Rights to do wrong may be conceptually possible, but (contra Waldron, Enoch, and Herstein) they are not necessary (even) within the framework of interest-based rights aimed

at preserving autonomy. Intuitions to the contrary can be explained as stemming from a cautionary principle motivated by the asymmetry between the risk of wrongly interfering and that of refraining from interfering.

13 Ryan Ausperk (Kent State U.)

Flesh and Society: Merleau-Ponty and the Possibility of an Intersubjective Political Regime

On Merleau-Ponty's view, the self is essentially a social construct. Therefore, moral worth or goodness of the self should be determined by how one's self relates to other selves and how one's self reacts to struggle in dynamic and fluid situations. I attempt to show how Merleau-Ponty's radical or "savage" ontology maps onto the social and political sphere. I discuss Merleau-Ponty's notion of the flesh and its intersubjective nature, and also the social implications of the concept of the flesh in terms of political action and Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of Machiavelli. Then I outline Merleau-Ponty's denial of the Marxist dialectic and his suggestion for a parliamentary democracy. Ultimately, I argue that we have only seen a minimal amount of the deconstructive virtues of Merleau-Ponty's suggestions for a radical conception of ontology and that the virtues of a truly experimental, hyperreflective, and hyperdialectic re-constructive politics remains to be instituted.

14 Marco P. Camacho (U. Kansas)

Measuring Perfections: A Problem for Perfectionism

Aristotelian Perfectionism (hereafter, AP) is the view that human well-being is determined by the development of one's essential properties. In *Perfectionism*, Thomas Hurka argues that the intrinsic value of an achievement associated with the development of these essential properties is determined by

extent and hierarchical dominance. Extent is the degree to which a perfection extends and stretches across objects and times.

Hierarchical dominance is the degree to which the perfection has other perfections subordinate to it. In this paper, I argue that extent and hierarchical dominance are inadequate for figuring the intrinsic value of a perfection. To do this, I first give a rough sketch of AP. I then consider a set of cases to demonstrate that the intrinsic value of a perfection is not necessarily determined by extent and hierarchical dominance. After considering a counter objection, I conclude by arguing that measuring perfections remains a problem for AP.

15 Alysha Kassam (CSU Los Angeles)

Anarchism: An Incomplete and Confused View

Political obligation is one's moral duty to comply with the laws of the state and is essential for a polity to function and prosper. The problem of political obligation is related to the larger issue of state legitimacy. There are four main views concerning political obligation and state legitimacy: a priori anarchism, a posteriori anarchism, those that find that one is politically obligated within a legitimate state and posit an account of state legitimacy, and finally those that find that one is necessarily politically obligated regardless of whether the state is legitimate or not.

Although these four positions are considered distinct, in this paper I will argue that the a priori anarchist and a posteriori anarchist essentially want to say something similar to those that find one is politically obligated within a legitimate state and posit an account of state legitimacy. Moreover, I will argue that the way in which the a priori and a posteriori anarchist distinguish their views from a view that posits an account of state legitimacy are not based on principled reasons and rather, the distinction is due to the

incompleteness and confusedness of their theories.

16 George Schieck (SDSU)

Spinoza and 'Blessedness'

Spinoza's notion of 'blessedness' as the goal or pinnacle of human thought, has been – at best – a challenging concept for many, and a mystery to others. I maintain that Garrett's view of this concept is largely correct. Also, while Spinoza is using traditional theological language, I further maintain that his sense of 'blessedness' is neither sacred nor secular, but rather a combination of both (i.e., 'sacular,' or 'secured'), as per his pantheistic ontology. Lastly, for those who believe – as I do – that aesthetics is a helpful and even necessary adjunct to a philosophical world view, this is where we find the locus or intersection for aesthetics in Spinoza's philosophy, namely via his concept of 'blessedness.'

17 Christian Weede (CSU Long Beach)

Grounds for Divorce from Presentism

In this paper I will argue that if we accept a theory of grounding, presentism yields counterintuitive results. Since the presentist believes that the past is not real, neither are any objects that are wholly in the past. So, if we think there are truths about the past, such as 'the Royal Library of Alexandria was constructed in the 3rd century BC', then the Royal Library cannot serve as the ground for that truth because the Royal Library is no longer present. Thomas Crisp attempts to solve the grounding problem with ersatz B-series times. I argue that if ersatz times are nominalistic abstract entities, then they are mind-dependent and are not fundamental constituents of the world. If ersatz times are Platonic, then their properties are fixed. Since past times once had the property of being present, their properties change.

18 Nathaniel Greely (CSU Los Angeles)

Phenomenal Intentionality and the Extended Mind Meet Again

Phenomenal Intentionality (PI) and the Extended Mind (EM) are two seemingly disparate new movements in the philosophy of mind. Horgan and Kriegel, in “Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind” (2008), argue that EM is compatible with the semantic internalism of PI. They claim that PI constitutes the sort of “broadly Cartesian” outlook that EM is meant to challenge, and thus this compatibility undermines EM’s significance. I argue, to the contrary, that the letter of EM does conflict with another broadly Cartesian claim, that mental states are subjective. Nonetheless, EM is still compatible with PI’s claims regarding the subjectivity of phenomenally intentional states. This shows, I argue, that the compatibility between the two research programs is not due to EM’s insignificance, but to Horgan and Kriegel’s conservative formulation of the tenets of PI.

19 Colten Steele (U. Hawaii)

Wholly Spinoza! Or Why It Is Good To Feel Good: A Case For Why Pleasure Is Wholesome in Spinoza’s Philosophy

In this paper, I argue that pleasure for Spinoza is always wholesome, meaning related to all parts of the body and beneficial to a body’s well-being. If something disrupts my body’s pattern of motion and rest, then it is pain. As such, I will further argue that titillation is actually not a pleasure in the strict sense for Spinoza, as it involves one or more parts of the body over the whole, thus disrupting the body’s equilibrium. I will distinguish titillation from the positive sensuous feeling associated with one part of the body over others, thus maintaining and arguing that Spinoza still supports partaking in pleasures such as good tasting food and drink, music, snuggling, etc. To determine whether or not

something is a pleasure, though, one must look past just the sensuous stimulation to how it affects the whole body. Thus, for example, a flu vaccine can be the cause of pleasure, even though it causes a localized, uncomfortable sensuous feeling, insofar as it contributes to the well-being of the whole body.

In the paper, I begin by amassing from the *Ethics* Spinoza’s definition of “pleasure” and fitting this definition into the broader scheme of his philosophy. Taking care to distinguish pleasure from titillation, I then make the case for understanding pleasure as wholesome by arguing that pleasure is wholesome in the two senses I mentioned above, both related to all parts of the body and beneficial to the whole body’s well-being. Next, I raise and deal with a few ways in which one might object to this idea. I close the paper by suggesting that Spinoza is not only encouraging us to seek that which is truly pleasurable for us, but that doing so will actually lead to a better understanding of ourselves.

20 Mark Eberle (Arizona State U.)

Qualia Functionalism

The paper demonstrates a diagnosis of contemporary confusions regarding the ontological significance of the term “qualia” and phenomenal consciousness more generally. In light of this confusion, a promising approach to providing a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness is proposed. As such this paper should be of interest to a broad range of philosophers interested in qualia, consciousness, reduction, physicalism, mental properties, and related topics in the Philosophy of Mind and Metaphysics.

21 Natalia Karablina (SUNY-Albany)

War and Justice in Plato’s The Republic

Plato suggests the account of justice in his *The Republic*. He claims that justice is to do the job that is best suited for you (433b-c). However, it might seem that he doesn't apply this concept of justice to the level of international relations. In this paper I will claim that Plato's account of justice applies toward the level of international relations. I'll argue that since for Plato justice in the soul and in the city is governance of reason over desires, then it follows that justice in international relations for Plato is the rulership of kallipolis (which symbolizes reason) over non-Greek cities (which symbolizes the desires). If reason loses control, it inevitably leads to the war in the soul, city or in the relations between them.

22 David Beglin (UC Riverside)

Blame as Protest and the Moral Competence Requirement

The question of whether psychopathic agents, agents who cannot grasp or apply moral reasons, are felicitous targets of blame has become a topic of much debate in the literature on moral responsibility. Most often, a theorist's answer to this question is determined by her account of blame. On one recent account of blame, the protest view, blame functions as protest to claims that impugn one's moral standing. This view's major proponents all hold that psychopathic agents are felicitous targets of blame. In what follows, however, I argue that these theorists should accept a moral competence requirement. These theorists, I argue, are committed to a standard of propriety that psychopathic agents simply cannot meet. Particularly, we shouldn't understand psychopathic agents' actions as making claims that impugn one's moral standing. And on the protest view, I contend, one is a felicitous target of blame only if one's action makes such a claim.

23 Nanhee Byrnes (UCSD)

The Democracy Dualists' Conjecture

The person who cuts the cake must choose last. Rawls declared that this is an instance of perfect procedural justice. The fairness of the procedure warrants a fair outcome. Democracy dualists' conjecture is that democracy is also an instance of a perfect fair procedure. Dualists hold that democracy is substantively and formally just simultaneously. Dualism seems to be the only option. Pure outcome arguments are claimed to be committing the fallacy of inferring 'from expert to boss.' Pure proceduralism meets the coin toss challenge. Unlike the coin toss fairness, 'democratic' procedural fairness can warrant the fairness of the outcome. The question is whether outcome fairness and procedural fairness can mix. I maintain that the permissibility of the mix is thanks to the conjecture. Despite the popularity of dualism, not many questioned the truth of the conjecture. This paper aims to show the falsity of the conjecture. I show that the set of procedures which are both inherently fair and produce fair outcomes is empty, based on the analysis of two dualists' theories that are particularly composed to vindicate the conjecture. They are 'complex proceduralism' and 'epistemic proceduralism.' It is no surprise that dualists are proceduralists since dualism is founded on procedural justice. Yet I maintain their theories are consequentialist at crucial junctures. I end this paper with a consequentialist's defense of the inference from expert to boss.

24 (see abstract entry for # **05**)

25 Andrew Lavin (UCLA)

Mapping Perception

This paper seeks a new solution to the problem of perception by positing a new map of possible positions in the philosophy of perception. Along with the usual direct and indirect realist theses, rendered slightly

differently, there is a third option that has often been missed. The newly distinguished thesis—presentational realism—is that perceptual content is determined by both the world and the percipient, and that there are no intermediaries between the representing subject and the represented object because the subject is nothing over and above those processes doing the representing. For the presentational realist, perception is never wholly veridical nor wholly delusive, being instead the result of dynamic interaction, and therefore difference between veridical and delusive perceptions is one of degree and not kind.

26 Taylor Cyr (UC Riverside)

Ockhamism and Backward Causation

Nelson Pike famously articulated an argument for incompatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise. If God exists and is essentially omniscient, and if the scope of God's omniscience ranges over events that will occur, it apparently follows that we lack freedom to do otherwise. One response to Pike's argument is Ockhamism, which first distinguishes between hard facts about the past (intuitively "over and done with") and soft facts about the past (not "over and done with") and second argues that some of God's past beliefs about the future are soft facts about the past. Eddy Zemach and David Widerker develop an Ockhamism approach that relies on an externalist account of the propositional content of beliefs and promises to insulate Ockhamism from the problems associated with their Ockhamist predecessors' views. I argue that because it requires systematic backward causation, Zemach and Widerker's approach suffers more problems than other Ockhamist strategies.

27 Zak Kopeikin (U. Colorado-Boulder)

Ronald Dworkin's "Hard Cases:" Advance Directives, Uncertainty, and Life-Saving Treatment

Ronald Dworkin argues demented and incompetent patients ought to be treated in accordance with their advance directives, even when this is contrary to their current stated preferences. Dworkin's account seems to entail that when the patient's competency is completely uncertain or we are in complete ignorance and use the principle of indifference (both make the probability the patient is competent 0.5), there's no a priori reason for her doctor to honor either the current request or the advance directive when the patient's life is on the line. Intuitively this is wrong: if we're totally unsure of whether or not a patient is competent and one choice will result in the patient's wrongful death, it seems obvious this is the worse action to perform. Thus there seems to be a conflict between our intuition and what Dworkin's account seemingly entails. I show that, due to an asymmetry between the disvalue of the moral violation that wrongfully causes the patient's death and the disvalue of the violation that wrongfully extends it, Dworkin's account and our intuition don't really conflict at all. My paper shows that the patient's doctor has an a priori pro tanto reason to give treatment in these cases, regardless of whether the request for treatment is a current autonomous desire or one embodied in an advance directive. I discuss a few objections, show they fall short, and conclude with a brief discussion about how my conclusion generalizes to other cases where we are roughly unsure of the patient's competence.

28 Michael Fitzpatrick (Stanford)

Badiou's Paradox of Politics and Aesthetics

Alain Badiou formulates a radical separation between art and politics, a formulation which produces a paradox in Badiou's work since his own writing on concrete artworks often reveals an intimate relation to politics. After

summarizing the antecedent French-Germanic tradition on political art, I present Badiou's broader framework of "dialectical materialism," so as to situate politics and art therein as particular truth-procedures, material processes that are faithful to revolutionary events and that carry out the production of truths. Badiou holds art and politics as radically heterogeneous with respect to each other. However, Badiou's other writings seem to contradict this theoretical heterogeneity, in both his conception of art forms such as theater and cinema, as well as his analysis of particular artistic works. I conclude by resolving the paradox through a theory of the intersection of truths, such that truths are radically separate but can temporarily co-exist in the same spatio-temporal location.

29 Matthew Leonard (USC)

Mereological Harmony and Substantialism

It is impossible for my arm to be a part of my body without my arm's location being a part of my body's location, and vice versa. Supersubstantialism, the view according to which material objects are identical to their locations, immediately assures us of this. Dualist substantialism, the view according to which material objects are located at (though not identical to) regions of spacetime, can also assure us of this by introducing mirroring principles. But supersubstantialism comes with a number of controversial mereological consequences and dualists tell us that this is a reason to reject supersubstantialism. In this paper, I argue that dualists who reject the possibility of the above sort of misalignment case are pressured to accept all of the mereological consequences of supersubstantialism.

30 Brandon Rickabaugh (Biola U.)

Grounding & Personal Identity: An Enduring Problem for Animalism

To persist, to continue to exist through time and change, is essential to being human, and there is virtual unanimity that we persist. Whatever I am, I am a persisting thing. Hence, any ontology of human persons that undermines our persistence is implausible. I argue that animalism--roughly, the view that we are each a human animal--is inconsistent with endurantism---roughly, the view that one and the same object exists at different times or with different classes of features. I analyze the connections between the core animalist notion of a 'life' and the persistence conditions of animals. It is argued that lives cannot, in and of themselves, endure, that the persistence of an animal is grounded in the persistence of that animal's life, and therefore, that animals cannot endure.

31 Eugene Chislenko (Berkeley)

The Ethics of Willpower

I argue that empirical studies suggest a legitimate use of the notion of willpower, by isolating a distinct kind of fatigue in our capacity to engage in demanding activities. This result raises a question about the proper attitude toward one's own willpower. I argue that we ought to accept two related norms: a norm of modesty, and a norm of confidence. Together, these norms require us to combine a sensitivity to limitations in our volitional capacities with a refusal to focus on those limitations. I conclude by describing a challenge these norms set for us in balancing empirical accuracy, awareness of one's freedom, and instrumental considerations in one's treatment of one's own willpower.

32 Megan Stotts (UC Riverside)

The Foundations of Expression Meaning

The fact that there are millions of meaningful words composing thousands of different languages may seem commonplace, but behind it lies a mystery. What makes intrinsically meaningless sounds into publicly

meaningful linguistic expressions? I argue that a type of sound counts as a meaningful expression in virtue of being a widespread, copied way of getting people to involve objects and relations in their activity. This account of expression meaning stands out from others in the literature by grounding expression meaning in a type of behavior rather than in intentions and beliefs. After arguing for a preliminary version of my account, I modify it in response to the objection that it over-generates expression meaning, and then I conclude by discussing the account's implication that expression meaning is logically independent from speaker meaning—the meaning of a word is not logically dependent on what people mean by it.

33 Rick Stoody (UCSB)

In Defense of Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Examples

Prior sign Frankfurt-style examples are offered as counterexamples to the following principle:

PAP(CC): When an agent is non-derivatively morally responsible for an action, he is so partly in virtue of having been able to have done otherwise.

The dilemma defense, a powerful reply to these Frankfurt examples, argues that these proposed counterexamples either presuppose causal determinism, begging the question against incompatibilists, or they do not, thereby failing to successfully eliminate the relevant alternative possibilities. John Martin Fischer has responded to the dilemma defense by offering a Frankfurt inspired argument in which causal determinism is assumed without begging the question. In this paper I argue that Fischer's response to the dilemma defense, tantalizingly close as it comes to success, falls short. However, I think that Fischer's general strategy is a good one and

that "blockage" Frankfurt examples can succeed where prior sign examples fail.

34 Jaryth Webber (U. Texas-Arlington)

Selection and Exaptation: An Essay in Philosophical Biology, Representation, and Culture

In "Selection and Exaptation: An Essay in Philosophical Biology, Representation, and Culture" there are a few main components. The first such component encompasses the first two sections. In section 1, a few views of species ontology are presented before being assessed for difficulties, particularly for both normativity and logical modality, with remarks on kind-hood and its relation to Millikan's "reproductively established families." Section 2 surveys a couple of nominalistic conceptions of kinds. Section 3 traces the two varieties of reproductively established families, along with a few of their consequences, which Millikan herself takes great pain to emphasize. The following section, 4, cannot be understood apart from its predecessor, for it delimits Millikan's notion of sentential representation, qualifying it by incorporating an account of the intentional domain of normativity. Section 5 introduces the notion of exaptation. Before ending with a few metaphilosophical reflections, section 6 considers the impacts of the views corroborated between the preceding sections' arguments upon selectionist accounts in the philosophy of biology.

35 Kevin Watson (CSU Long Beach)

Tracing and Offloading: A Neo-Lockean Reply to Johnston

In "Human Beings" and *Surviving Death*, Johnston appeals to the ways in which we are mutually available—the way we just know if a person is a person and whether they persist—to reject neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity on metaphysical grounds. Since the first publication of "Human

Beings," authors have requested that Johnston flesh out his argument against neo-Lockeanism. After over two decades, Johnston finally outlined the argument during his Carl G. Hempel Lectures series published as the book *Surviving Death*. However, Johnston fails to show that persons are mutually available.

In this essay, I respond to Mark Johnston's arguments against neo-Lockeanism presented in *Surviving Death*. I defend neo-Lockeanism against Johnston's claim that we do not use criteria when tracing persons over time. Furthermore, I argue that Johnston's account of mutual availability misrepresents research in cognitive science.

36 (see abstract entry for # **11**)

37 Anthony Ferrucci (U. Washington)

On Thought Experiments and Idealization

In this paper, the relationship between thought experiments and idealization in science is explored. First, I defend a conception of thought experiments similar to that of John Norton, who claims that thought experiments are just picturesque arguments. Then, I briefly survey some competing interpretations of thought experiments and their difficulties. Next, I argue that John Norton's second necessary condition for a good thought experiment is really just a requirement for involving Aristotelian idealization or the stripping away of all of the irrelevant properties from the objects we are trying to focus on, properties that do not affect the overall goal or intention of the thought experiment. I argue that a necessary condition for thought experiments, on Norton's view, involves some form of idealization. This is an important discussion in the literature on scientific modeling, where thought experiments have not been tied to general discussions of modeling in any concrete way.

38 Christopher Bobier (UC Irvine)

Locke on a Government's Right to Punish Foreigners

Social contract theories ground a government's right to punish in a mutual agreement (i.e., contract) among citizens: a person may be rightfully punished by a government for violating a law because she contracted with her fellow citizens to be governed by that law or governmental authority. Social contract theorists have a *prima facie* difficulty grounding a government's right to punish non-citizens (e.g., foreigners). In the *Second Treatise of Government*, John Locke explains why, within social contract theory, a government may rightfully punish foreigners. The problem is, however, that he offers two seemingly incompatible explanations. On the one hand, Locke claims that a government's right to punish foreigners is grounded in consent; on the other hand, he claims that a government's right to punish foreigners is grounded in the natural right that every person has to punish a violator of natural law. After highlighting the apparent inconsistency, I argue that the best solution is to interpret Locke's two accounts as over-determining a government's right to punish foreigners: a government has distinct, individually sufficient grounds that justify its punishment of non-citizens.

39 Alexander Kaiserman (Oxford & Princeton)

Causes and Counterparts

There is an as-yet unnoticed tension between David Lewis' counterpart theoretic analysis of *de re* modality and his metaphysics of causation. I describe this tension and discuss how it can be resolved. I also argue that Jonathan Schaffer's 'contrastive' account of causation makes the very same mistake.

40 Douglas Campbell (U. Toronto)

Al-Fārābī and Plato on Common Knowledge in the Ideal City

In this essay, I argue that the disagreement between al-Farabi and Plato about whether everyone in the ideal city knows the conclusions of philosophical research is reducible to disagreements about the nature of knowledge and of symbols. I begin by laying out al-Farabi's conception of the ideal city and how the various classes obtain knowledge of philosophical conclusions. I attend first of all to that subset of people who, al-Farabi claims, acquire knowledge through the testimony of philosophers. Then, I present two responses by Plato, one of which turns on a special interpretation of the *Theaetetus* that is inspired by Myles Burnyeat. The profit of both replies is that testimony is not sufficient for the acquisition of philosophical knowledge. I next discuss al-Farabi's view that symbols --- or, religion --- can imbue the souls of non-philosophers with knowledge. I conclude by arguing that Plato would have denied this claim as well, in light of considerations offered in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*.

41 Yu Nakahiro (New School, NYC)

Redemption of Here-and-Now – on Benjamin's Historical Materialism

Discussing why Benjamin's analysis on art in the age of mechanical reproduction must have been done at a dimension of 'historical materialism,' the paper mainly deals with the following question: what does the mechanical reproduction mean to the fate of art as well as the 'origin' of history? The mechanical reproduction is the fatal and fateful problem which could jeopardize the concept of origin as an epistemological ground of Benjamin's thinking, in that it is a challenge from a sphere of technique to uniqueness and repeatability that constitute his dialectical thinking. To recognize a constellation as the dialectical images of the origin in modern

times defined by the between of the mass and technique – starting from this awareness, the paper shows that Benjamin opposes to a symbolic formula of the mass and technique represented as fascism and delves deeper into an allegoric formula, namely, a new possibility of here-and-now.

42 Elis Miller (U. New Mexico)

Empirical Erkenntnis in the first Critique

In the Second Analogy of experience Kant illustrates the succession of time by the passing of a ship that represents the irreversibility of apprehensions. With this analogy he demonstrates that rules are somehow built into experience, mediated by schema that govern between concepts and intuitions. What is unclear, and the source of much debate among Kantian commentators, is how we can be certain of our intuitions, our experience, and ultimately what Kant describes as "*empirical Erkenntnis*". The notion of *empirical Erkenntnis* is not only problematic for the Second Analogy, but also holds contentious weight in other sections of the first *Critique*. In this paper I explore the empirical lacuna between certainty of apprehensions and the rule like function of causality that is to instantiate them. I look at two prevalent readings of Kant's concern in the Second Analogy, both of which are believed to have shortcomings in different ways, and argue for a holistic reading of the first *Critique* by applying Kant's argument in the Transcendental Analytic to clarify his position in the Second Analogy.

43 Michael Devitt (CUNY)

Keynote Address for SDSU Weber Conference

Testing Theories of Reference

How should we test theories of reference? The accepted practice is to test them against the referential intuitions of philosophers.

Machery *et al* (2004) wonder why it is appropriate to rely on the intuitions of philosophers rather than those of the folk. I wonder why it is appropriate to rely on referential intuitions at all. We should not go along with the common philosophical view that these intuitions are a priori. Philosophers might follow linguists in thinking that linguistic intuitions are “the voice” of our linguistic competence. But this view is false. Rather than relying solely on the indirect evidence of intuitions, theories of reference need direct evidence from linguistic usage. The talk briefly considers the problems of doing this.

44 Tyler Olsson (San Francisco State U.)

***The Ontological Primacy of Reflexivity:
Using Heidegger’s Call of Conscience to
Ground Absorbed Normativity***

Part of what it means to be human is that we are, on the one hand, unreflectively absorbed in what we are doing, and on the other hand, capable of being reflectively observant of those activities. Hubert Dreyfus has used this distinction to say that absorption is the more important aspect of the two because the phenomenology of expertise informs us that “thought is the enemy” to the extent that it comes secondary to and interrupts the flow of skillful coping. Accordingly, Dreyfus claims that this goes to show that absorption grounds our reflexivity—our capacity to step back and reflect. If we understand this grounding relation as an ontological one, understood in the traditional Heideggerian sense, then Dreyfus is incorrect. I draw on textual evidence from *Being and Time* to argue that the calling voice of conscience is the condition for the possibility of being a normatively bound agent insofar as it allows us to, in a reflective way, recognize and take responsibility for what our actions demand to be successful.

45 Sherri L. Conklin (UCSB)

***Intentional Actions and Unintentional
Outcomes: Problems for Praise-Blame
Asymmetry***

The Side-effect Effect leaves us with a puzzle. How is it that Chairman HARM acts intentionally and Chairman HELP does not, when both act for the same reasons? Along a similar vein, why is Chairman HARM blameworthy for his wrong act and Chairman HELP not praiseworthy for his right act, when both acted for the same reasons? I agree that this Praise-Blame Asymmetry is correct, but I doubt the underlying justification for Praise-Blame Asymmetry if it is based in judgments about agent intentions tracking the Side-effect Effect. I argue that Knobe’s participants fail to distinguish between intending an act and intending its outcome, meaning that laypeople inconsistently apply the criteria for intentional action. Consistent application requires symmetrical claims about the intentions of the two chairmen. I conclude that each chairman intentionally implemented the program and unintentionally helped or harmed the environment. This argument leaves Praise-Blame Asymmetry in tact.

46 Tim Sparks (Temple U.)

Democracy, the Environment, and Love

The foundational assumption of this paper is that discourse is the best way to arrive at conclusions concerning how a society ought to act. In the governmental arena, this process is, or at least ought to be, democratic. This paper asks how this discursive process applies to questions of the environment or the more-than-human world. In seeking to show how humans can represent environmental concerns in the governmental arena, I will draw upon Catriona Sandilands’ conception of a *point de capiton* and will argue that, by virtue of a loving relationship between human and non-human, a human may come to represent the non-human in the governmental

arena. In order to show how this is possible, I will draw from Frankfurt's concept of love and his dismantling of the intrinsic and extrinsic value dichotomy (at least as it relates to love).

47 Ben Sheredos (UCSD)

A Plea for Recognizing Graphical Vagueness

I argue that pictorial representations (in Greenberg's (2013) sense) can be *vague*, by showing that we regard some of them as if they possessed what Stewart Shapiro (2008) calls *open texture*. Graphical vagueness has not been previously recognized. The payoffs vary depending upon one's preferred view of vagueness. If one regards (graphical) vagueness as *semantic* in nature, one may impose an unappreciated *desideratum* upon accounts of pictorial semantics: they should accommodate and explain graphical vagueness. I show, for example, that Greenberg's analysis of pictorial semantics would need to be radically revised to meet this *desideratum*. There are, however, non-semantic (i.e., *epistemic* and *metaphysical*) conceptions of vagueness, and one could insulate an account of pictorial semantics from the issue of graphical vagueness by pursuing these options. Another potential payoff, then, is that recognizing graphical vagueness may provide new tools for delineating the *scope* of a proper account of pictorial semantics.

48 Corey McGrath (UCSB)

Color Relationalism and Perceptual Error

In his 2009 book *The Red and the Real: An Essay in Color Ontology*, Cohen defends a version of color relationalism, the view that colors are relations. In particular, Cohen defends relationalism against the charge that it cannot account for errors in color perception, such as hallucinations and illusions. Central to this defence is a novel

semantics for ascriptions of color, according to which such ascriptions are context-sensitive. However, this response conflates perceptual and linguistic representation, which are wholly distinct and have fundamental differences in nature. In any case, on any of the three commonplace understandings of context-sensitivity, Cohen's semantics of ascriptions of color is implausible. I conclude that Cohen has failed to adequately respond to the objection to relationalism from perceptual error.

49 Travis Timmerman (Syracuse)

Sometimes There is Nothing Wrong with Letting a Child Drown

Peter Singer argues that we are morally obligated to donate to aid agencies whenever we can do so without sacrificing anything nearly as important as a child's life. Premise two of his argument is "If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so." I argue that Singer's Drowning Child thought experiment fails to justify the truth of this premise. I do so by offering my own Drowning Children thought experiment, which is a better analogy of the situation between people in affluent nations and those in the third world than Drowning Child. People's intuitions in the case I provide should reveal they think that, upon reflection, premise two is actually false. After considering, and rebutting, objections to my argument, I conclude that we have good reason to doubt the soundness of Singer's argument.

50 Jonathan Shoemaker (UC Irvine)

False Second-Order Beliefs and Socrates' Denial of 'Akrasia'

Most scholars believe that Socrates holds that virtue is knowledge. The position seems patently false because it seems obvious that

our desire for pleasure often causes us to act against how we think we should act. In the *Protagoras*, however, Socrates denies that acting against our belief of what we should do is possible. In every case, we always act for the sake of what we believe is good and never for the sake of what we believe is bad. In the *Gorgias*, however, Socrates commits himself to a psychology that allows that we can have false second-order beliefs when we act. I argue in this presentation that false second-order beliefs can cause important moral beliefs to become latent beliefs, which will allow one to act against what one really believes is true. This outcome will prove to be a serious problem for Socrates' doctrine that virtue is knowledge.

51 John Martin Fischer (UC Riverside)

Keynote Address

Libertarianism and the Problem of Metaphysical Flipflopping

I argue that libertarianism faces a daunting problem of metaphysical flipflopping, according to which one gives up a basic metaphysical principle on the basis of unrelated empirical data. Given the unacceptability of metaphysical flipflopping, libertarianism renders our moral responsibility unacceptably fragile (our personhood would "hang on a thread").

Undergraduate Student Division:

52 Chandler Rogers (Biola U.)

The Faithless Author(s) of Fear and Trembling: Kierkegaard and de Silentio in Perspective

Contemporary Kierkegaard scholarship has minimized the autobiographical aspect of *Fear and Trembling*, insisting that the view of faith presented in the work is essentially distinct from Kierkegaard's own view and that the work's pseudonymous author, Johannes de Silentio, is emphatically distinct from Kierkegaard. I seek to temper this view by maintaining that although de Silentio is an invented personality, he is not utterly distinct from Kierkegaard. I argue that de Silentio is analogous to the Kierkegaard of 1841, and that the view presented in the work is reflective of Kierkegaard's inchoate view of faith.

53 James Johnson (UCLA)

Francisco Suarez: Concurrentism and Sinful Acts

In this essay I look at Francisco Suarez's understanding of God's cooperative role in natural causation. Suarez holds to a concurrentist view in which God's causal contribution is immediate, per se, and universal. Explication of these tenets of concurrentism is offered in order to distinguish the view from occasionalism and mere conservationism. Finally, I consider a worry for the concurrentist: God cannot act sinfully, yet he causally contributes to the production of sinful acts. I argue that despite God's causal contribution to sinful actions, he is nevertheless exonerated from moral responsibility for the action. The culpability of sin is accorded based on the particular order of causality, rather than the universal order of causality. God's contribution being in the universal order alleviates the trouble Suarez's concurrentism faces.

54 Heather Stewart (U. Louisville)

Caring for the Monster: Analysis of the Emotional Investment in the Character Norman Bates

In this paper, *Caring for the Monster: Analysis of the Emotional Investment in the Character Norman Bates*, an argument is presented for the ability to establish an emotional connection with a “villainous” character of the horror genre, which takes the form of empathy. Establishing empathy early in the narrative causes the viewer to take the perspective of the “villain”, as opposed to the “victim” that usually becomes the subject of our emotional investment. “Caring for the Monster”, the phenomenon described in the paper, seems to reverse what is intuitive about how we think about horror, allowing us to establish empathy for the “monster”, and maintain that empathy throughout the duration of the narrative, despite the immoral deeds of that character. This paper focuses on the way in which Alfred Hitchcock achieves this through Norman Bates in the 1960 film, *Psycho*.

55 Anna Brinkerhoff (Pepperdine)

The Hart-Dworkin Debate: Legal Positivism and Theoretical Disagreements

In this paper, I dive into the historic debate between H.L.A Hart – the champion of legal positivism – and Ronald Dworkin – its critic. Specifically, I examine Scott Shapiro’s positivist response to Dworkin’s charge that Hart and other positivists cannot account for the genuine theoretical disagreements that are prolific among philosophers and practitioners of law alike. I argue that Shapiro’s response is largely successful; however, it requires clarification and amendment insofar as he assumes an answer to rather than accounts for the possibility of a pivotal type of theoretical disagreement. To amend, I argue for distinguishing between the broad and narrow meanings of grounds of law and realigning Shapiro’s response in light of them.

56 (see abstract entry for # **05**)

57 James Johnson & Garry Soronio (UCLA)

Is Divine Simplicity Compatible with Divine Contingent Knowledge?

The paper will present a possible way of showing the compatibility of the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS) and God’s knowledge of contingent facts. First, we will explain the meaning of DDS that God is without any parts but is identical to His attributes including His knowledge, and the logic behind it. Then we will introduce the perceived incompatibility of DDS and divine contingent knowledge. Then we will propose routes to resolve it, Avicennan view, Lewisian view, and the view that God’s contingent knowledge is extrinsic to Him. The third route is found to be most plausible through a model where God’s knowledge has objective reality and formal reality.

58 Paige Massey (Pepperdine)

Art Appreciation

In the aesthetic debate, the cognitivist argues that we should appreciate art for cognitive benefit. We who are not sure where we fit in to the “art world” likely affirm, at least intuitively, that we should value art for what we can learn from it. We are probably less decided about whether, in valuing art for its contributions, we value art *as* art. One way to defend cognitivism about art is to describe how art shapes our knowledge in ethics; this is where I depart from many cognitivists. I will defend cognitivism by developing a conception of art appreciation grounded in epistemology, in particular, the relationship between art and epistemic defeaters. In departing from the method of defending cognitivism in relation to ethics, my account both escapes some problems of the ethical account and better articulates how we can value art as art.

59 Ryan Scheuring (Chapman U.)

A Rejection of the Metacoherence Requirement

Some philosophers argue that it is epistemically irrational to have certain kinds of belief and deny that we have knowledge of that belief. One of these particular philosophers is Michael Huemer who argues for the Metacoherence Requirement, or: *If one categorically believes that P must, upon reflection, claim to know that P*. This view is mistaken because belief that P is a categorically different species of claim than an assertion that P, which I argue is equivalent to a knowledge claim. The difference is that while asserting P outright is a claim about external reality, claiming a belief that P is merely a description about one's own mental state. This categorical difference is why we can be epistemically rational in categorically believing something while denying to have knowledge of that proposition. A positive account is offered that argues that anti-metacoherence is in fact more consistent with our actual experience and intuitions.

60 Garry Soronio (UCLA)

Francisco Suárez's Defense for Substantial Form and Bid for the Reification of Matter

The paper will explain Francisco Suárez's substance ontology, and maintain that his defense for Scholastic metaphysical principles of substantial form and matter was successful against detractors. First, I will lay out the objections against and Suárez's rigorous defense for the existence of substantial form. Second, I will provide Suárez's sophisticated exposition of substantial form and matter that is faithful to the general understanding of these concepts in Scholastic worldview, yet modified to avoid the objections mentioned above. He particularly reified matter and introduced more ontological density to it. Third, I will explain what for Suarez, essential unity is the principle of unity for matter and form, rather than existential unity as a consequence for his modification.

61 (see abstract entry for # 11)

62 Cheryl Frazier (Barry U.)

The Pleasure of Pain: Why We Choose to Engage with Tragic Works of Fiction

For years, philosophers have attempted to explain why we consume works of fiction, especially those which elicit extremely negative emotions. Why is it that we actively seek out movies, books, paintings, and music that bring us to tears? What about the agony of the Titanic makes the film worth visiting, especially when we otherwise shy from similar scenarios? In her essay, "A Strange Kind of Sadness," Marcia Eaton attempts to explain this phenomena, arguing that we engage with tragic works because of the control we have over them. In this paper I will argue that her solution is inadequate, instead claiming that our attraction to these works stems from a desire for a safe, detached experience which results in emotional catharsis. I will also argue that these works provide the opportunity to further connections in the global community, as they allow for exposure to new experiences and ways of life.

63 Kari Hanson (U. Minnesota-Morris)

The "Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument" as Presented by Colyvan: Logical Form and the Role of Naturalism

I consider Mark Colyvan's presentation of the "Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument" for mathematical realism. I ask and answer two questions: what is the logical nature of the argument and are both confirmation holism and naturalism essential. I examine the argument as deductive and explain problems that arise when taking the argument to be of this form with the way Colyvan incorporates naturalism. As a potential way of resolving those problems, I consider the possibility of taking the argument as an inference to the best explanation (abductive).

After developing a definition of abduction, I consider whether the indispensability argument fits the definition, and conclude that it does not. From this I further conclude that the argument must be deductive. I then defend the importance of naturalism, and explain how modifying the argument's contents and giving a proper defense of the premises removes the deductive structural problems and clarifies the role of naturalism.

64 (see abstract entry for # **43**)

65 Cameron Davis (Johns Hopkins)

Human Rights and Moral Antirealism

In this paper, I argue that serious and perhaps insurmountable metaethical challenges to moral realism extend to human rights and that, consequently, the concept of human rights needs a drastic revision. I argue that if human rights are to have a strong philosophical foundation, human rights claims will need to be, and perhaps can coherently be, understood as having no commitment to moral truth. In the end, I suggest that human rights claims, because of their unique history, can be recognizable without a commitment to inescapable rational obligation even though generic moral claims cannot. At the end of my paper, I put forth a possible antirealist interpretation of human rights claims, which construes these claims as functioning primarily to improve collective action among those who—not because of superior rationality—are motivated to protect human interests and protect others from great suffering.

66 Garry Soronio (UCLA)

Is Albert Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity a Rejection of Absolute Simultaneity and a Challenge to Presentism?

The paper will explain Albert Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (STR), and that

while STR relativizes simultaneity, it does not necessarily reject Presentism. First, I will review the debate between Presentism (A Theory of time) and Static Block View (B Theory of Time) regarding the nature of time. Presentism upholds a common sensical view that ordinary observers perceive: the present moment has a privileged ontological significance compared to the past and future, and posits absolute simultaneity as an essential feature. Second, I will present an exposition of Einstein's Special Relativity and how its two foundational principles, the relativity of inertial frames and the invariance of the speed of light, demolish the notion of absolute simultaneity and privileged frame of reference. STR conjugates space and time together into a four-dimensional space-time structure (Minkowski's spacetime), whereby two events are separated by a value called space-time interval. Then, I will show how STR challenges Presentism, through the Putnam-Rietdijk thesis that events in Minkowski's spacetime are real with respect to each other, hence endorsing that events in every time (past, present and future of different light cones) are equally real. Finally, I will advance different responses from the Presentist side to either reject it, or modify itself to adopt a compatibilist approach, thereby showing that STR does not undermine the Presentist position, while salvaging the quintessential elements of both STR and Presentism.

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Leibniz's Monads: Was He Consistent?

In this essay, I will evaluate Gottfried Leibniz's argument for the existence of monads and what can be said about them. First, I will introduce the infinite divisibility of Cartesian matter. Second, I will introduce the difference between an accidentally ordered and an essentially ordered causal series. Both of which are essential to understanding Leibniz's argument. I will,

then, discuss Leibniz's argument for the existence of monads and discuss what can be said of them. Finally, I will evaluate whether the existence of the monads is consistent with what he thinks can be said of them; namely, that they are composed of primitive active forces and primitive passive forces. I will find the charge of inconsistency unsuccessful given his commitment to nominalism.

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