1st Annual SoCal Philosophy Conference in San Diego

in three divisions:

-- Faculty/Peer Division --
-- Graduate Student Division --
-- Undergraduate Student Division --

Conrad Prebys Student Union Building, SDSU

Saturday & Sunday, 19-20 October 2013

PROGRAM

-- Faculty/Peer Division --

Saturday
19 October 2013

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Undergraduate Conference – Ethics

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01   0800 / Music Building Room 120
Russell Disilvestro (CSU Sacramento)
Capabilities, Rights, and Sex-Selective Abortions

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02   0930 / Aztec Mesa Room 107
Zoe Close (Grossmont)
Wittgenstein's Mirror: Reflections on His Style and Methodology

03   0930 / Aztec Mesa Room 105
Melinda Campbell (National U)
Color Events

04   1030 / Aztec Mesa Room 103
David Pitt (CSU Los Angeles)
The Paraphenomenal Hypothesis

05   1100 / Aztec Mesa Room 107
Michael Cholbi (Cal Poly Pomona)
How Grief Makes Our Lives Go Well

06   1100 / Aztec Mesa Room 105
Jonathan Cohen (UC San Diego)
Sensory Substitution, Information, and Perceptual Emergence

07   1130 / Aztec Mesa Room 103
Andrew Howat (CSU Fullerton)
Peirce, Grounding, Circularity and Regress

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Graduate Conference – Aesthetics

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08   1230 / Music Building Room 120
Leon Rosenstein (SDSU, Emeritus)
Perceptions of Aesthetics

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09   1400 / Aztec Mesa Room 107
Andy Lamey (UC San Diego)
Scanlon's Dilemma: Contractualism and Moral Motivation

10   1400 / Aztec Mesa Room 105
Sandra Wawrytko (SDSU)
Why Metaphysics is for Hedgehogs and Epistemology is for Foxes: Global Philosophy in the 21st Century

11   1530 / Aztec Mesa Room 107
Mark Wheeler (SDSU)
Plato on Love and Agency

12   1530 / Aztec Mesa Room 105
Jon Winterbottom (UC Santa Barbara)
Justifying Harm-based Reparations for Historical Injustice

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
SoCal Conference

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13   1700 / Music Building Room 120
David Brink (UC San Diego)
Mill's Perfectionism

-- Graduate Student Division --

Saturday
19 October 2013

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Undergraduate Conference – Ethics

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14   0800 / Music Building Room 120
Russell Disilvestro (CSU Sacramento)
Capabilities, Rights, and Sex-Selective Abortions

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15   0930 / Aztec Mesa Room 103
Christopher Bobier (UC Irvine)
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and the Problem of Unfounded Distinctions
Moderator: Meredith McFadden (UC Riverside)

16   0930 / Music Building Room 207
Philip Walsh (UC Irvine)
Plural Subjects and Plural Subjectivity
Moderator: Courtney Morris (UC Riverside)

17   0930 / Music Building Room 215
Jason Cruze (Biola U.)
I Too Am a Potential Sinner: Humility and the Moral Standing to Blame
Moderator: Jessica Reed (Biola U.)

18   1030 / Music Building Room 207
Casey Hall (UC Irvine)
Aiming to Shame?
Moderator: Patrick Ryan (UC Riverside)

19   1030 / Music Building Room 215

Sam Zahn (SDSU)
The Power of Ideas and Consciousness in Spinoza's Ethics
Moderator: Courtney Morris (UC Riverside)

20   1130 / Music Building Room 207
Luis H. Favela (U. Cincinnati)
Direct Realism, Disjunctivism, and Ecological Psychology
Moderator: Ryan Walsh (USC)

21   1130 / Music Building Room 215
Matthew Owen (Biola U.)
A Reply to Kim's Causal Argument
Moderator: Brandon Rickabaugh (Biola U.)

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Graduate Conference – Aesthetics

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22   1230 / Music Building Room 120
Leon Rosenstein (SDSU)
Perceptions of Aesthetics

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23   1400 / Music Building Room 207
Meredith McFadden (UC Riverside)
Explanation, Justification, and the Guise of the Good
Moderator: Aaron Mead (UCLA)

24   1400 / Music Building Room 215
Jessica Reed (Biola U.)
The Problem of Evil: A Literary Perspective on Human Suffering
Moderator: Matthew Owen (Biola U.)

25   1500 / Aztec Mesa Room 103
Ryan Walsh (USC)
A Hard Problem for Schroeder's Analysis of Perceptual Knowledge
Moderator: Casey Hall (UC Irvine)

26   1500 / Music Building Room 207
David Gordon Limbaugh (Biola U.)
What Common-folk Refer To by Animal: A Reply to Dean Zimmerman
Moderator: Philip Walsh (UC Irvine)

27   1500 / Music Building Room 215
Brandon Rickabaugh (Biola U.)
In Defense of the Simple View of Conscious Persons
Moderator: Jason Cruze (Biola U.)

28   1600 / Aztec Mesa Room 103
Aaron Mead (UC Los Angeles)
Qualities as Proper Grounds of Love
Moderator: Christopher Bobier (UC Irvine)

29   1600 / Music Building Room 207
Patrick Ryan (UC Riverside)
Beyond Expressive Power: Cassirer's Critique of Logic
Moderator: Luis H. Favela (U. Cincinnati)

30   1600 / Music Building Room 215
Courtney Morris (UC Riverside)
A New Reading of Kant's First Paralogism
Moderator: Sam Zahn (SDSU)

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
SoCal Conference

31   1700 / Music Building Room 120
David Brink (UC San Diego)
Mill's Perfectionism

Sunday
20 October 2013

32   0830 / Aztec Mesa Room 107
Kevin Siefert (SDSU)
Aristotle and Anxiety
Moderator: Theron Pummer (UC San Diego)

33   0830 / Aztec Mesa Room 105
Monique Wonderly (UC Riverside)
Love and Attachment: The Value of Self-Interestedness in Loving Relationships
Moderator: Douglas C. Wadle (CSU Los Angeles)

34   0830 / Aztec Mesa Room 103
Terence Sweeney (Loyola Marymount)
Seeing the Color of Your Eyes: A Personalist Critique of Levinas
Moderator: Nate Greely (CSU Los Angeles)

35   0930 / Aztec Mesa Room 107
Theron Pummer (UC San Diego)
Intuitions about General Principles
Moderator: Rick Stoody (UC Santa Barbara)

36   0930 / Aztec Mesa Room 105
Joshua Butler (Loyola Marymount)
The Place for Metaphysics in Husserl's Phenomenological Philosophy
Moderator: Tiffany Chang (USC)

37   0930 / Aztec Mesa Room 103
Nate Greely (CSU Los Angeles)
Nietzsche and the Herd
Moderator: Monique Wonderly (UC Riverside)

38   1030 / Aztec Mesa Room 107
Douglas C. Wadle (CSU Los Angeles)
A Problem with Proprietary Cognitive Phenomenology
Moderator: Joshua Butler (Loyola Marymount)

39 1030 / Aztec Mesa Room 105
Rick Stoody (UC Santa Barbara)
Defusing the Timing Objection to Frankfurt-style Counterexamples
Moderator: Terence Sweeney (Loyola Marymount)

40 1030 / Aztec Mesa Room 103
Tiffany Chang (USC)
Auctions, Luck and Responsibility
Moderator: Kevin Siefert (SDSU)

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
SoCal Conference

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41 1130 / Music Building Room 120
David Kaplan (UC Los Angeles)
My Early Philosophical Development

-- Undergraduate Student Division --

Saturday
19 October 2013

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Graduate Conference – Aesthetics

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42 1230 / Music Building Room 120
Leon Rosenstein (SDSU)
Perceptions of Aesthetics

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43 1400 / Aztec Mesa Room 103
Hao Ji Zhu (UC Los Angeles)
Individual and Society: Comparison Study between Existentialism and Social Holism
Moderator: Colten Steele (SDSU)

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
SoCal Conference

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44 1700 / Music Building Room 120
David Brink (UC San Diego)
Mill's Perfectionism

ABSTRACTS:

Faculty/Peer Division:

01   Russell Disilvestro (CSU Sacramento)

Keynote Address for SDSU Undergraduate Ethics Conference

Capabilities, Rights, and Sex-Selective Abortions

02   Zoe Close (Grossmont)

Wittgenstein's Mirror: Reflections on His Style and Methodology

The objective of this paper is to search out and enumerate the features of Wittgenstein's style and methodology which make his work inaccessible to the reader. The paper uses Wittgenstein's statements about his own writing as a medium through which to view these features. These comments are 1) internal to a published work; 2) found in notebooks and diaries; 3) part of correspondence; and 4) recorded conversations.
The paper is in two parts.
PART I shows that Wittgenstein's writing reveals a complex assemblage of forms and techniques that constitutes a style and method that has no preceding example in philosophy.
PART II shows that the features of Wittgenstein's work, taken collectively, reveal more general characteristics which make his writings elusive.

03   Melinda Campbell (National U)

Color Events

Traditional debates about the ontology of color have reached a standstill: Color objectivists maintain that colors are light-interactive properties of surfaces or substances, while color subjectivists insist that colors are perceptual projections onto a colorless world. Although opponents in this debate disagree about the reality of color, they nevertheless agree on certain phenomenological facts: No one denies that there is color experience. A way of settling the debate is offered by an alternative view of color, a hybrid theory that combines both objectivist and subjectivist intuitions about color, which takes appearances to be the primary evidence for the reality of color and sees colors as properties of appearance-events. These "color events" are exemplified by psychophysical relations involving perceivers engaged with an illuminated environment. The qualitative character of color experience, while constrained by neurophysiological structure, is also directly reflective of the particularity of individual substances and situations. By locating colors in appearance events, a common ground is established on which subjectivists and objectivists can meet. It is a place where colors exist only when seen and experience provides the best evidence for true judgments about colors.

04   David Pitt (CSU Los Angeles)

The Paraphenomenal Hypothesis

Reductive representationalism holds that the qualitative properties characterizing "what it's like" to have a perceptual experience are not intrinsic properties of the experience itself, but properties of the thing(s) the experience represents. An experience of the coldness of snow, for example, is no more cold than is our belief that snow is cold. In both cases coldness is part of the representational content of the state, which content is constituted by extramental objects and properties. I argue that non-veridical experience (illusions, dreams, hallucinations) cannot be accommodated on such a view, and that recent attempts to do so fall into absurdity.

05   Michael Cholbi (Cal Poly Pomona)

How Grief Makes Our Lives Go Well

From Plato through the Stoics, the predominant philosophical attitude toward grief was that it represents the antithesis of the rational self-control and self-sufficiency that characterizes a virtuous person. Contemporary philosophers have been far less interested in grief than their ancient counterparts. There is no obvious explanation for this inattention to grief, though one possibility is that contemporary moral philosophy is much more preoccupied with understanding and justifying social bonds than with addressing their dissolution. While contemporary philosophers have made suggestive remarks about why grief contributes to well-being, they have struggled to elucidate a clear and compelling account of what is good about grief. My aim here is to remedy this problem by outlining the theoretical foundations of an account of how it is at least possible for grief to contribute positively to well-being, allowing that some episodes of grief do not (or even make our lives worse on the whole). I first argue that among prominent philosophical theories of well-being, neither hedonism nor desire satisfaction theory hold much promise in explaining how grief can be good for us. I propose, in the spirit of objective list theories, that the benefit of grief is that the activity of grieving can foster a distinctive form of self-knowledge. The species of self-knowledge is, somewhat paradoxical: We succeed in grieving when we reach repose in our understanding of the nature and significance of the relationships transformed by the deaths of those with whom we stand in these relationships. But because these relationships are essential to who we are, successful grief culminates in a form of self-knowledge. This *relational self-knowledge view* of grief accords well with a wide range of psychological, phenomenological, and metaphysical facts about grief and indicates how it is at least possible for grief to be a benefit to us.

06   Jonathan Cohen (UC San Diego)

Sensory Substitution, Information, and Perceptual Emergence

Sensory substitution devices (SSDs) can be thought of as alternative informational channels that enlisted to carry the information normally delivered by a perceptual modality in cases where that modality is impaired. Unfortunately, because sensory modalities carry information about a very wide range of properties/events, the design challenge of building informational alternatives equal to the originals they aim to replace is significant.

Here is an attractively simple reaction to this concern. We might hope to ensure that the substituting channel captures everything wanted by just building SSDs that carry information about the form(s) of basic energy normally carried by the impaired modality they are intended to replace (and adding lots of computational power to code up whatever can be derived from the basic energy). Thus, for example, if we could build a device that carries in some alternative way information about the distal distribution of light intensity — the basic form of energy to which visual receptors are normally responsive — our device could, in principle, represent everything vision can represent: color, shape, form, motion, and so on.

Unfortunately, I will argue, this attractively simple idea fails. For there appear to be properties represented by our sensory modalities whose exemplification is not fixed by the representation of the distribution of (the relevant forms of) basic energy. Hence, a SSD whose basic representational vocabulary is limited to the distribution of such basic energy will inevitably leave things out.

None of this shows that SSDs will inevitably fail to represent what sensory modalities normally represent. It does suggest, however, that if we want them to represent what sensory modalities normally represent, then

we will have to do more than preserve the representation of basic energy to which the substituted modalities are sensitive.

07   Andrew Howat (CSU Fullerton)

Peirce, Grounding, Circularity and Regress

This paper is a contribution to the current debate over the notion of metaphysical grounding. It approaches this debate through a historical lens by examining the work of C.S. Peirce. The central question concerns how we can take seriously Peirce's grand ambitions for metaphysical explanation, or what we shall call Peirce's Rule - that nothing can be admitted to be absolutely inexplicable - without being vulnerable to a vicious regress or equally vicious circularity. It argues that in Peirce's early work he offers a quietist conception of grounding that provides a persuasive and ground-breaking answer to this central question. It then argues that in Peirce's later work we find a metaphysical conception of grounding that fails to answer that question.

08   Leon Rosenstein (SDSU, Emeritus)

Keynote Address for SDSU Graduate Aesthetics Conference

Perceptions of Aesthetics

09   Andy Lamey (UC San Diego)

Scanlon's Dilemma: Contractualism and Moral Motivation

Scanlonian contractualism is widely thought to offer an especially appealing account of moral motivation. Contractualism holds that we care about morality because it makes possible a relation of mutual recognition with other persons. This approach however faces a challenge in accounting for the status of cognitively disabled human beings who are not persons. Scanlon uses the device of a trustee who represents their interests to preserve the link between moral motivation and recognizing persons. While Scanlon's trustee device has been widely criticized, it has gone unnoted that contractualism's inability to adequately recognize the moral standing of non-persons reveals a deep problem for the theory's account of moral motivation. Once the trustee device is jettisoned it becomes clear that on Scanlon's own account sentience is more basic to explaining moral motivation than personhood. As such Scanlon's appeal to personhood is otiose at an explanatory level.

10   Sandra Wawrytko (SDSU)

Why Metaphysics is for Hedgehogs and Epistemology is for Foxes: Global Philosophy in the 21ˢᵗ Century

Once the undisputed ruler of academia, with metaphysics hailed as the queen of the sciences, philosophy is now forced to justify its very existence. How have we contributed to this dismissive attitude and, more importantly, how may we revitalize philosophy so it continues to contribute to ongoing scholarly research as well as serve the broader community? This presentation outlines diverse ways of thinking that have generated negative perceptions of philosophy's efficacy. While dogmatic, metaphysics-obsessed hedgehog thinking is a relic of the past, the epistemological orientation of skeptical fox thinking remains open to future developments. Most dangerous of all is hyena thinking, which sparks a cannibalistic feeding frenzy. Non Amero-eurocentric traditions often replicate these ways of thinking, but also can offer fresh approaches to expand our horizons and equip us to meet the challenges of the globalizing twenty-first century. Specific examples include the Buddhist wisdom of awareness (*appamāda*) and *prajñā-pāramitā*'s "wisdom gone beyond."

11   Mark Wheeler (SDSU)

Plato on Love and Agency

Abstract.

12   Jon Winterbottom (UC Santa Barbara)

Justifying Harm-based Reparations for Historical Injustice

A recent strategy to defend reparations claims for historical injustices against the non-identity problem posits an intergenerational chain connecting harms suffered by original victims of historical injustices with harms to their descendents. Unfortunately, current defenses of the strategy fail adequately to defend the idea that harms the children of original victims suffer are wrongful and hence cannot ground children's rights to compensation. This paper remedies this defect by appealing to the idea that under certain circumstances wrongdoers inherit duties toward third parties. I argue that a wrongdoer's failure to compensate the original victim likely prevents the victim from fulfilling her parental duty and, as such, the wrongdoer inherits this duty. On this approach, the wrongdoer's failure to compensate the original victim therefore also constitutes a harmful breach of an inherited duty that the wrongdoer owes the victim's child, and hence it constitutes a wrongful harm to the child.

13   David Brink (UC San Diego)

Keynote Address

Mill's Perfectionism

Graduate Student Division:

14   (see abstract entry for # **01**)

15   Christopher Bobier (UC Irvine)

Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and the Problem of Unfounded Distinctions

Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology states that for S's belief *that p* to count as knowledge, S's belief must be safe and formed by reliable cognitive abilities. S's belief *that p* is safe if, in most near-by possible worlds where S's belief is formed in the same manner as in the actual world, S's belief is true. S's belief *that p* is the result of reliable cognitive abilities if S's belief is formed using well-integrated cognitive processes, and it's to S's credit that she formed the belief. In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, that this account of knowledge draws distinctions between beliefs where, intuitively, there are none. Second, that this objection reveals that safety-based theories of knowledge fall prey to the same kind of objection to sensitivity-based theories of knowledge. This suggests that the safety-condition isn't clearly superior to the sensitivity-condition.

16   Philip Walsh (UC Irvine)

Plural Subjects and Plural Subjectivity

This paper draws on the resources provided by Merleau-Ponty's account of intentionality to clarify the ontology of collective intentionality. Individualists like John Searle maintain that bearers of collective intentions are individual minds. Holists like Margaret Gilbert claim that when we ascribe we-intentionality there is a single referent that our ascription designates. For Gilbert's account to work, she must posit a "plural subject" as the bearer of collective intentions. Searle dismisses such an account on the grounds that intentionality depends on consciousness, and there is no conscious entity that exists over and above the individual members of the collective. For Merleau-Ponty, intentionality

has an "anonymous core" which is characterized in terms of a unique form of unity—the body schema. This led him to make a distinction between "operant" and "thetic" intentionality which, I shall argue, allows for an account of collective intentions that is sensitive to both Searle and Gilbert.

17   Jason Cruze (Biola U.)

I Too Am a Potential Sinner: Humility and the Moral Standing to Blame

Imagine that you are the victim of a crime that seriously harms you. It is natural and normal that you be initially disposed to experience a range of emotions in response to how you were violated. It is understandable to react with the blaming attitudes of anger and resentment towards the wrongdoer. But now imagine, so far as you can, becoming fully aware of the facts that the wrongdoer's action was the result of a very brutal upbringing. Suppose that as a child the wrongdoer was subjected to severe physical and psychological abuse by both of his alcoholic parents and that the abuse was consistent throughout the wrongdoer's childhood. Now imagine, again, so far as you can, that you were put in your victimizer's exact same horrific formative circumstances. Is it morally reasonable to think that you would *not* have developed as vile as your victimizer? Intuitively, given the brutal circumstances, this seems unreasonable. In this paper I argue that a person lacks the *standing to blame* if the blamer might have done (or might have very *likely* done) the same thing (or same type of thing) as the blamed under the conditions (or sufficiently similar conditions) the blamed experienced. In such a case, the suggested humble response is what I call (following Gary Watson) the "I Too am a Potential Sinner" view (ITPS). In what follows, I aim to analyze and advance the ITPS view and offer possible objections and responses. I conclude that the ITPS view makes a simple intuitive point: if you are prepared to take the position of authority and blame Harris ("throw the first stone") for his wrongdoing, you must also be prepared to claim that you would have been able to exercise your freedom rightly in such brutal circumstances. Thus, the virtue of humility, as I explain it, affects our standing to blame certain wrongdoers. Once this virtue is appropriately formulated, we can see that it undermines our reactive attitudes and that we have compelling intuitive reasons to withhold moral blame.

18   Casey Hall (UC Irvine)

Aiming to Shame?

Shaming punishments are becoming more popular, and have been defended by legal scholars and some philosophers as attractive alternatives to incarceration. Part of the attraction, it is thought, is that these punishments teach the offender an important lesson about the social norms and values that her crime has violated. In this essay, I argue that most shaming sanctions are actually humiliating rather than shaming, and that there is a crucial difference between the two. Shame involves engagement with one's values in a way that humiliation does not. Punishments that merely humiliate, as most of the so-called 'shaming punishments' do, fail to live up to the justification for the alternative sanctions that anchor their use in the first place.

19   Sam Zahn (SDSU)

The Power of Ideas and Consciousness in Spinoza's Ethics

The identity of the physical and the mental in Spinoza entails that for every physical object there is corresponding mental content. This means that even rocks and shovels have "minds." For this reason, commentators find it important that Spinoza have a theory of consciousness, more specifically, a theory of *selective* consciousness or at least *degrees* of consciousness. But Spinoza does not offer any

explicit views on consciousness. Scholars have drawn several interpretations of consciousness in Spinoza from key passages in the *Ethics*, for example, that conscious thoughts are ideas whose objects are other ideas. Michael LeBuffe contends that conscious ideas are those with the most *power*. I argue that this interpretation is on the right track, and that consciousness is an idea's relation to the nexus of other ideas in a mind. What does this mean for mind-relativity? Is God conscious?

20   Luis H. Favela (U. Cincinnati)

Direct Realism, Disjunctivism, and Ecological Psychology

Many disjunctivists claim to be direct realists. Direct realism can be a conceptually and empirically justifiable theory of perception. However, many disjunctivists do not make a compelling case for direct realism. As long as the defender of direct perception accepts the concepts and arguments of the proponents of indirect perception, then she will not be able to provide a compelling account of direct perception. In particular, disjunctivists of the direct realism kind will not be able to provide a compelling account of direct perception as long as they view perception as presenting facts about the world to the mind via stimulus energy. In contrast, along with James J. Gibson and the ecological psychology tradition, I think that perception is best treated as a kind of action, and understood in terms of information and animal-environment interactions. Disjunctivists ought to be interested in this work as well.

21   Matthew Owen (Biola U.)

A Reply to Kim's Causal Argument

In this paper I summarize, analyze, and respond to Kim's Causal Argument for the rejection of immaterial minds. To summarize Kim's argument: (1) causation requires spatiality, (2) immaterial Cartesian minds are non-spatial, (3) therefore, it is *impossible* for immaterial minds to have causal efficacy and account for agency and cognition, (4) therefore dualism should be rejected. To summarize my reply to Kim: (1) Kim fails to show that the impossibility of mental causation on dualism is a logical impossibility, (2) therefore the question remains open as to whether there is genuine mental (non-physical causation) in the actual world, (3) there is a dualistic alternative to Cartesian dualism that accounts for mental causation better than its dualistic rival, and at least as well as Kim's preferred route of a functional reduction of the mental to the physical. My conclusion is that immaterial minds should not be rejected on the grounds Kim offers.

22   (see abstract entry for # **08**)

23   Meredith McFadden (UC Riverside)

Explanation, Justification, and the Guise of the Good

The guise of the good thesis states that in seeing a reason to pursue an end, an agent necessarily sees the end as good in some way. In this paper, I outline two versions of a broad strategy for rejecting this thesis. The strategy, which I call the explanation strategy, rejects the thesis on the grounds that in seeing a reason to pursue one's end, one need only see that end as intelligible, rather than good. I suggest that while Kieran Setiya and David Velleman both employ (problematic) versions of the explanation strategy, they posit importantly different views on the relationship between justificatory reasons and explanatory reasons. I argue that by considering how and why these views diverge, we can identify the desiderata for a successful version of the explanation strategy, one that will capture a plausible relationship between intelligibility, justification, and value in reasoning.

24   Jessica Reed (Biola U.)

The Problem of Evil: A Literary Perspective on Human Suffering

The problem of evil is the lead challenge to belief in the existence of God, specifically the God of Classical Theism. Evil- especially human suffering- is a daily occurrence. Logically, God and evil cannot coexist. The problem also concerns suffering, specifically the amount of suffering allowed if God really did exist. Literature reflects how this touches humanity at an emotional level. Both of these challenge the traditional view of God as omnipotent (all-powerful), omniscient (all-knowing), and omnibenevolent (perfectly good). Using logical analysis and examples of dialogues from literature, I argue in support of the existence of Judeo-Christian God from the perspective of Christian theism in response to the Problem of Evil and the logical and emotional challenge it presents.

25   Ryan Walsh (USC)

A Hard Problem for Schroeder's Analysis of Perceptual Knowledge

Recently Mark Schroeder has offered an analysis of knowledge that is in the tradition of so-called defeasibility analyses of knowledge. These views suggest that knowledge is true belief whose justification stands up to the facts. On Schroeder's version of this idea, knowledge is a matter of believing on the basis of epistemic reasons which are both subjectively and objectively good enough. Here I show that Schroeder's analysis implies that agents have perceptual knowledge when, intuitively, they have been Gettiered. There are two *prima facie* attractive views, one of which is widely held, about the nature of perceptual reasons that could help Schroeder to avoid this result. But I note that elsewhere Schroeder has argued against the first view and then argue that the second is ultimately implausible. This shows that the

problem is harder to solve than it might at first appear, and especially so if you are Schroeder.

26   David Gordon Limbaugh (Biola U.)

What Common-folk Refer To by Animal: A Reply to Dean Zimmerman

In objection to Eric Olson's thinking animal argument, Dean Zimmerman uses a version of the replacement argument to demonstrate the intimate relationship between animalism and biological minimalism, the thesis that there are only fundamental simples and organisms. A replacement argument considers, what if in addition to the human animal there is also, a brain, an undetached head, a constituted-person, a hunk-of-matter, etc.? What if all of these objects are thinking, and thinking the same thoughts? This raises a host of problems; including *how do I choose which one I am?* The answer is biological minimalism. Unfortunately, by escaping the replacement argument, the thinking animal argument is no longer justified. I object to Zimmerman by advancing the thesis that when I say, "there is a chair" it does not commit me to the existence of chairs, then demonstrating that common-folk refer to *animals* when they speak of "animals" (regardless of ontological commitments) and finally, showing how this combination is enough to salvage justification for Olson's argument.

27   Brandon Rickabaugh (Biola U.)

In Defense of the Simple View of Conscious Persons

It is recalcitrant that I am a conscious being, and there is a unity to my consciousness. I experience my self as an individual not composed of separable parts. According to a dominant thesis the brain is the locus of consciousness which has separable parts. Thus, we have two disparate views: (a) I am a conscious being composed of separable parts,

and (b) I am a conscious being not composed of separable parts. This paper analyzes an argument for (b) advanced by David Barnett,[1] and an objection from Andrew Bailey[2] which relies on Ted Sider's work on maximality and consciousness.[3] It is argued that this reply to Barnett fails because Sider's argument is in fact motivated by an intuition that favors (b) over (a). Moreover, it is argued that intuitions in favor of (b) are not undermined by Sider's assumption that a successful account of consciousness must assume microphysical supervenience.

28   Aaron Mead (UC Los Angeles)

Qualities as Proper Grounds of Love

In this paper I defend the quality theory of the proper grounds of love against the substitution problem. The quality theory holds that qualities like beauty or virtue are proper grounds for loving someone—i.e., considerations that render such love appropriate. The substitution problem holds that the quality theory is mistaken since it implies I should be indifferent to the substitution of my beloved for her type-identical doppelganger. After all, if the beloved's qualities are proper grounds of my love, then I have identical grounds for loving the doppelganger. In reply, I argue that either substitution is unproblematic (e.g., in dating relationships) or the reason I would not be indifferent to substitution has nothing to do with the proper grounds of love. Rather, my *commitment* to the beloved is the reason I would not be indifferent, which can be viewed as a consideration wholly different from love's proper grounds

29   Patrick Ryan (UC Riverside)

Beyond Expressive Power: Cassirer's Critique of Logic

Frege reforms logic by expanding its expressive power. I'll develop a suggestion made by Ernst Cassirer that Frege's reformation required a further step: we also need a new theory of the concept, the lack of which creates circularity in Frege's deduction of number: the relation "equinumerous to..." can only be used to construct an equivalence class if the members of the coordinated classes are already conceived of as ordinal numbers. By filling out the details of the objection, which Cassirer does not do, I'll show that this problem arises because Frege relies on a particular conception of objectivity, according to which a concept's objectivity is established if the concept corresponds to a feature of a given object (empirical or abstract objects) or a possible combination of objects. I'll elaborate this conception and show that it creates problems within mathematical practice by considering the historical puzzles surrounding irrational numbers.

30   Courtney Morris (UC Riverside)

A New Reading of Kant's First Paralogism

In the "Paralogisms," Kant critiques the doctrine of rational psychology, which concludes that the soul is a simple substance identical over time and hence immortal, imperishable, and indestructible. Although commentators generally applaud Kant's critique of rational psychology, they disagree about the exact nature of the mistake the rational psychologist supposedly makes. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of the argument that the soul is a substance. Specifically, I argue that the rational psychologist thinks they are entitled to conclude that a thinker is a substance *tout court* because they do not recognize that the concept of substance is "amphibolous," or ambiguous. Indeed, the ambiguity in the concept of substance is rooted in the inherent ambiguity in what Kant calls the "concepts of reflection." Recognizing this greatly illuminates the first paralogism.

31   (see abstract entry for # **13**)

32   Kevin Siefert (SDSU)

Aristotle and Anxiety

The concept of anxiety as a pathological condition and ailment has been investigated and contested since its introduction into the modern world of psychology and philosophy. Some argue that anxiety is actually a pseudo-concept, with no true source or referent. But if one is to seriously consider anxiety as involving a conjunction between bodily states and mental representations of the world as a state of affairs to be avoided, we seemingly have a starting point of where to begin an investigation into the nature and cause of anxiety. Taking an account of *phantasia* as given by Aristotle, and interpreted by Moss, and how we are motivated towards such representations, we can further see how misrepresentations of the *akratic* can lead to pathological anxiety. It is the intent of this paper to give a brief account of *phantasia* in Aristotle as understood by Jessica Moss, and apply such cognitions towards contemporary understandings and causes of anxiety.

33   Monique Wonderly (UC Riverside)

Love and Attachment: The Value of Self-Interestedness in Loving Relationships

It is not uncommon for philosophers to name disinterestedness, or some like feature, as an essential characteristic of love. Such theorists claim that in genuine love, one's concern for her beloved must be non-instrumental, non-egocentric, or even selfless. These views prompt the question, "What, if any, positive role might *self-interestedness* play in genuine love?" In this paper, I argue that attachment, an attitude marked primarily by self-focused emotions and emotional predispositions, helps constitute the meaning and import of at least some kinds of adult reciprocal love. In this way, attachment represents a type of self-interestedness that not only contributes positively to such relationships but is also *essential* to them.

34   Terence Sweeney (Loyola Marymount)

Seeing the Color of Your Eyes: A Personalist Critique of Levinas

In my paper, I propose that we heed Levinas demand that we philosophize without totalizing the other; however, I critique Levinas for having done just that by failing to take into account the other as our concrete other. In this, I argue that Levinas's Other is an abstract Other who can neither be harmed nor helped because his Other is fundamentally the Infinite. As a consequence, Levinas's account abstracts from actual persons, thereby undermining a full understanding of the other who is a concrete person.

35   Theron Pummer (UC San Diego)

Intuitions about General Principles

There are often conflicts between intuitions about general ethical principles and intuitions about more particular ethical propositions. When there are such conflicts, we can either: *retract* our intuition about the general principle, *rebut* the (intuitive case for the) particular proposition that opposes the principle, or *reiterate* that the principle is nonetheless intuitive, even in the face of unrebutted purported counterexamples. Here I focus on when, if ever, it is appropriate to reiterate rather than retract. I offer a test for determining when a general principle is *independently* intuitively supported, and thus when it may be appropriate to maintain this principle even when a purported counterexample to it is unrebutted. Finally, I raise the question whether any general principle is independently supported in this way, and in particular whether the claim that the "all-things-considered better than" relation is transitive passes this test.

36   Joshua Butler (Loyola Marymount)

The Place for Metaphysics in Husserl's Phenomenological Philosophy

The father of modern phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, argues that any attempt to conceive of the world apart from consciousness is quite simply nonsensical. Rather, the world *is* only what we experience. For Husserl, phenomenology describes how the world presents itself to us; it does not explain why we naturally accept the world as existing. This position stands in stark contrast to traditional metaphysics.

The emphasis of this presentation is how phenomenology and metaphysics should interact, specifically in relation to Husserl's approach. I maintain that the former method is a necessary component for knowledge of the world, but that it must not be set in strict opposition to the latter. I present various ways in which the two disciplines can interact and offer several criticisms of a purely phenomenological methodology.

37   Nate Greely (CSU Los Angeles)

Nietzsche and the Herd

Nietzsche's tirades against women and against democracy are two of the most distasteful parts of his philosophy for modern scholars. Lynne Tirrell offers an insightful analysis that uses Nietzsche's anti-essentialism and his tendency toward the dissolution of opposites to draw feminist conclusions that she claims he should have drawn, had he been more consistent. In this article a similar strategy is used to dissolve the opposition of individual and herd, an essential part of Nietzsche's critique of democracy. This dissolution follows the same pattern Nietzsche establishes in his analysis of good and evil, mind and body, and cause and effect, among others. The opposites resolve into a fundamental, active phenomenon and its recently overvalued, reactive "refinement".

The individual that Nietzsche prizes so highly and holds against the herd is shown to be a refinement of the herd. As such, the herd should be fundamental, active, and of higher value, contrary to what Nietzsche actually claims. This process leads us, however, also to question the duality of active and reactive and whether the difference may be only a matter of perspective.

38   Douglas C. Wadle (CSU Los Angeles)

A Problem with Proprietary Cognitive Phenomenology

In the last fifteen or twenty years the view that the qualitative character of thinking is a distinctive, non-sensory (or motor or affective) phenomenology – namely, a *cognitive* phenomenology – has gained some currency (Pitt 2004, 2009, 2011; Siewert 1998, 2011; Strawson 1994, 2011). Call this view the proprietary cognitive phenomenology (PCP) thesis. The PCP thesis maintains, further, that it is only in virtue of this phenomenology that we are able to know the narrow contents of our thoughts. I will argue that support for this claim relies on the (reasonable) background assumption that, for all thinkable contents, p, a token, 'S', of a mental state, S, directly expresses that p iff every 'S' directly expresses that p, but that, on closer inspection, there is no way to interpret this assumption such that it both applies to PCP contents and satisfies the epistemic claim made regarding those contents.

39   Rick Stoody (UC Santa Barbara)

Defusing the Timing Objection to Frankfurt-style Counterexamples

The principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) states that "someone is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise" (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 829). Derk Pereboom (2012, 2013) has recently revised *Tax Evasion*, his influential Frankfurt-style counterexample (*FSC*) to

PAP, to deal with Carl Ginet's (2002) "timing objection." However, David Palmer (2011, forthcoming) argues that Pereboom's revision does not avoid the objection. In this paper I respond to Palmer's argument and provide a revised *FSC* that successfully deals with the timing objection.

40   Tiffany Chang (USC)

Auctions, Luck and Responsibility

One much debated strand in the literature on distributive justice from the past 30 years is the view known as *luck egalitarianism*. A core commitment of luck egalitarianism is that it is wrong for individuals to suffer through no choice or fault of their own and that distributive justice should redress such wrongs. The fullest account of this central idea is provided by Dworkin's Auction Theory, which models equality of resources through a series of hypothetical auctions in which people are given equal opportunity to bid for resources and to purchase insurance against bad brute luck such as disability or lack of natural talent. These auctions are subject to the restriction that no individual envies another's bundle of resources. The auction theory is significant because it may be regarded as one of the most compelling defenses of the capitalist welfare state that, moreover, weds the concerns of egalitarians and libertarians alike by regarding the notion of responsibility as fundamental to distributive justice. In this paper, I present hypothetical scenarios in which the two most plausible income tax schemes to result from the application of the theory conflict with the aforementioned restrictions on the hypothetical scenarios. The auction theory, I ultimately argue, suffers from an internal inconsistency by allowing results that conflict with the underlying motivations of the theory.

41   David Kaplan (UC Los Angeles)

Keynote Address

My Early Philosophical Development

Undergraduate Student Division:

42   (see abstract entry for # **08**)

43   Hao Ji Zhu (UC Los Angeles)

Individual and Society: Comparison Study between Existentialism and Social Holism

The relationship between individuals and society has long been an essential area of study for social philosophy. What is the ontological nature of individual Being? And what is a plausible relationship between Being and its external society? Where do individuals stand in the external order of things? Are we ultimately alone or are we social beings in groups? This presentation reflects a comparison analysis between existentialism and social holism in approaching above questions. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, and Heidegger are studied from the existentialism spectrum; while *The Social Construction of Reality* by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, and Schutz are studied from the social holism perspective. Through which, I hope to provide a useful outline for future study of social philosophy.

44   (see abstract entry for # **13**)

Undergraduate paper accepted but unable to attend:

01 Brian Rizzo (Vanderbilt U.)

Why William James was Wrong about Moral Holidays

William James and Josiah Royce are among the biggest names in the history of American philosophic thought. James a pragmatist and Royce an idealist, their writings are largely oppositional but both seek answers to the same question of how to live well. Therein, Royce's answer to the imperfect triad and revolutionary conception of God charged humans with infinite, God-like duties in the business of world's perfection; such a notion of duty compelled James to write on what he called "moral holidays," slightly ambiguous periods of relaxed moral obligation and limit. While this idea seems to be a logical attempt to escape the high demands of Royce, was it logical within James' own lines of thought concerning liberty and pragmatism? The answer to such question, made in the negative, is the aim of this paper.