SoCal Philosophy Conference

SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY

Third Annual
SoCal Philosophy Conference
17 October 2015

Room Location:	Faculty		Grad Students		Undergrad Students	
	Council Chambers	Legacy Suite	Visionary Suite	Tehuanco	State Suite	Presidential Suite
8:30	Registration (Courtyard)					
9:00	**Todd Jones** (U. Nevada-LV) "Accounting for Sociolinguistic Factors That Create Apparently Competing Accounts"	**Seungbae Park** (UCSD) "Various Pessimistic Inductions and Their Imports"	**Alex Misthos** (SDSU) "A Reply to Quine"	**Rena Goldstein** (CSULA) "Exercise as Progress: You Can't Win for Losing"	**James Johnson** (UCLA) "William Ockham: Judicative Acts of Assent and Chatton's Conception of Truth"	**Brett Castellanos** (Grad Presentation) (Florida State) "Problems for Non-Volitional Accounts of Moral Responsibility"
10:00	**Eric Yang** (Claremont McKenna) "Does Death Restriction-Harm Us?"	**John Park** (Christopher Newport) "Hybrid Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Theories & Moral Truth"	**Michael Fitzpatrick** (Stanford) "Analysis, Synthesis and the Cartesian Gym"	**Robert Siscoe** (U. Arizona) "Contextualism Without Representation: A Response to the Meaning-Intention Problem"	**Carlos Flores** (UCSB) "Is 'Sex Reassignment Surgery' Medicine?"	**Austin Beltrand** (UCLA) "A Neurological Account of Perceptual States"
11:00	**Alex Rajczi** (Claremont McKenna) "Moral Transformation and Obligations to Others"	**Sandra Wawrytko** (SDSU) "A Buddhist Critique of Metaphysical Coherence and its Social/Political Liabilities"	**Andrew Lavin** (UCLA) "Counterfactuals in Leibniz"	**Stephen Bero** (USC) "Responsibility and Our Self-Conceptions as Agents"	**Thomas Hicks** (UCLA) "On the Priority of Substance in Thomistic Philosophy"	**Heather Stewart** (U. Louisville) "Uncovering Gender in Hegel's 'Ethical Order' in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*"
12:00	Continental Conference Keynote: Prof. Mark Wrathall (UC Riverside) — Theatre					
1:00	**Joshua Butler** (Loyola Marymount) "A Kuhnian Critique of Hume on Miracles"	**Michael Cholbi** (Cal Poly Pomona) "Esoteric Moral Theories"	**Meredith McFadden** (UC Riverside) "Difficulties in the Relationship between Reasons and Values"	**Jason Schukraft** (U. Texas–Austion) "Why Intuition Is Not Like Perception"	**Jaycob Izso** (Portland State U.) "Between Marx and Foucault: Counter-Conduct and Emancipation"	**Garry Soronio** (UCLA) "Galileo Galilei's Copernicanism, Shift of Scientific Paradigm, & the Complementarity of Faith & Reason"
2:00	SoCal Conference Keynote: Prof. Mark Johnson (U. Oregon) "Embodied Mind, Embodied Meaning, Embodied Value" — Theatre					
3:30						**Garry Soronio** (UCLA) "Anselm's Doctrine of Freedom of the Will and the Angelic Fall"
4:30	**Steven Barbone** (SDSU) "Spinoza and Female Trouble"	**Bob Dunton** (IERG at Simon Fraser U.) "Dewey and Nietzsche on Morality and the Will to Power"	**Julian Gonzalez** (U. Kansas) "Scanlon's Misguidance in Rawls' Reflective Equilibrium"	**Taylor Cyr** (UC Riverside) "Taking Hobart Seriously"		**James Johnson** (UCLA) "Zagzebski: Entitlement to Epistemic Trust"
5:30	Informal Social for Conference Participants and their Guests — Terrace Patio over the Arch					

Third Annual
SoCal Philosophy Conference in San Diego

in three divisions:

◆

Faculty/Peer Division
Graduate Student Division
Undergraduate Student Division

◆

Conrad Prebys Student Union Building
San Diego State University

Saturday, 17 October 2015

PROGRAM

◈ Faculty/Peer Division ◈

01 9:00 – 9:50 / Council Chambers
Todd Jones (U. Nevada-Las Vegas)
Accounting for Sociolinguistic Factors That Create Apparently Competing Accounts

02 9:00 – 9:50 / Legacy Suite
Seungbae Park (UCSD)
Various Pessimistic Inductions and Their Imports

03 10:00 – 10:50 / Council Chambers
Eric Yang (Claremont McKenna)
Does Death Restriction-Harm Us?

04 10:00 – 10:50 / Legacy Suite
John Park (Christopher Newport U.)
Hybrid Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Theories & Moral Truth

05 11:00 – 11:50 / Council Chambers
Alex Rajczi (Claremont McKenna)
Moral Transformation and Obligations to Others

06 11:00 – 11:50 / Legacy Suite
Sandra Wawrytko (SDSU)
A Buddhist Critique of Metaphysical Coherence and its Social/Political Liabilities

07 12:00 – 12:50 / Theatre
Mark Wrathall (UC Riverside)
Keynote Address for SDSU's 5th Annual Student Philosophy Conference

08 1:00 – 1:50 / Council Chambers
Joshua Butler (Loyola Marymount)
A Kuhnian Critique of Hume on Miracles: Miracles and Paradigm-Conflicting Scientific Anomalies

09 1:00 – 1:50 / Legacy Suite
Michael Cholbi (Cal Poly Pomona)
Esoteric Moral Theories

10 2:00 – 3:20 / Theatre

Keynote Address
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Embodied Mind, Embodied Meaning, Embodied Value

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Spinoza and Female Trouble

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Bob Dunton (IERG at Simon Fraser)
Dewey and Nietzsche on Morality and the Will to Power: Irreconcilably Different, or "Naturally" Allied?

◈ Graduate Student Division ◈

13　9:00 – 9:50 / Visionary Suite
Alex Misthos (SDSU)
A Reply to Quine

14　9:00 – 9:50 / Tehuanco
Rena Goldstein (CSU L.A.)
Exercise as Process: You Can't Win for Losing

15　9:00 – 9:50 / Presidential Suite
Brett Castellanos (Florida State)
Problems for Non-Volitional Accounts of Moral Responsibility: Core Akratic Actions and Irresistible Desires

16　10:00 – 10:50 / Visionary Suite
Michael Fitzpatrick (Stanford)
Analysis, Synthesis and the Cartesian Gym

17　10:00 – 10:50 / Tehuanco
Robert Siscoe (U. Arizona)
Contextualism Without Representation: A Response to the Meaning-Intention Problem

18　11:00 – 11:50 / Visionary Suite
Andrew Lavin (UCLA)
Counterfactuals in Leibniz

19　11:00 – 11:50 / Tehuanco
Stephen Bero (USC)
Responsibility and Our Self-Conceptions as Agents

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Meredith McFadden (UC Riverside)
Difficulties in the Relationship between Reasons and Values

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Jason Schukraft (U. Texas-Austin)
Why Intuition Is Not Like Perception

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Taking Hobart Seriously

◈ **Undergraduate Student Division** ◈

26 9:00 – 9:50 / State Suite
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Anselm's Doctrine of Freedom of the Will and the Angelic Fall

36 3:30 – 4:20 / Presidential Suite
James Johnson (UCLA)
Zagzebski: Entitlement to Epistemic Trust

◈ ABSTRACTS ◈

Faculty/Peer Division:

01   Todd Jones (U. Nevada-Las Vegas)

Accounting for Sociolinguistic Factors That Create Apparently Competing Accounts
It's not uncommon for scientists to give different explanations of the same phenomenon.   But it's not obvious when such accounts are competing and when they are complementary.   When people don't see that two accounts compete, they can easily accept false explanations.   If two accounts don't compete, people can waste time and energy needlessly trying to figure out which one is right.   Either way, not knowing if the accounts compete leaves us in a bad epistemic state.   In this paper, we will specify how one family of *discourse rules* enables there to be accounts that appear to compete, but don't.   We hope that being more aware of the linguistic mechanisms making compatible accounts appear to compete will prevent people from wasting resources trying to show which account is right.

02   Seungbae Park (UCSD)

Various Pessimistic Inductions and Their Imports
There are various pessimistic inductions in the philosophy of science literature. Poincaré's pessimistic induction over scientific theories (1905/1952) holds that present theories will be overthrown as were past theories. Stanford's pessimistic induction over scientists (2006) holds that present scientists cannot conceive of future theories just as past scientists could not conceive of present theories. Wray's pessimistic induction over realists (2013) holds that present realists are wrong about present theories just as past realists were wrong about past theories. Park's pessimistic induction over antirealist explanations of the success of science (2014)

holds that the present antirealist's proposal has hidden problems just as its several predecessors did. After criticizing the pessimistic inductions over scientific theories, scientists, and realists, I construct the pessimistic induction over antirealists, according to which the present antirealist cannot see hidden problems with his proposal just as past antirealists could not see hidden problems with theirs.

03   Eric Yang (Claremont McKenna)

Does Death Restriction-Harm Us?
Recently, Stephan Blatti has argued that a deprivationist view (DV) of death's harm is sorely incomplete, and he presents a view such that the kind of distinctive harm that death brings to an individual involves the restriction of that individual's autonomy. Not only does death deprivation-harm us, but it also restriction-harms us. Let us label such an account—one that includes both deprivation and restriction as comprising death's harm—as a 'deprivationist-restrictionist view' (or 'DRV'). Blatti favors DRV because it avoids several worries that beset DV. In this paper, I present several objections to DRV; in particular, I raise some problems for the claim that death restriction-harms us and show that even DRV does not avoid the worries of DV.

04   John Park (Christopher Newport U.)

Hybrid Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Theories & Moral Truth
There has been a recent resurgence of hybrid cognitive and non-cognitive theories in metaethics. What have not been heavily discussed as compared to other topics in this hybridism literature are justifications as to whether hybrid theories lead to a deflationary theory of truth or to a more robust one, such as a correspondence or coherentist view. If moral

judgments express both beliefs and conative states, such as emotions or desires, then are moral judgments capable of being more robustly true or only true in a deflationary sense? Some contemporary hybridists merely assume that their hybrid view leads to a more robust theory of truth or to a deflationary one without argument. However, I will offer arguments that hybrid views should be understood as maintaining a more robust theory of moral truth; a view on truth that is consistent with cognitivism.

05 Alex Rajczi (Claremont McKenna)

Moral Transformation and Obligations to Others

Some ideas play important roles in the world's great ethical and religious traditions but a comparatively minor role in modern ethics. One such idea is that our moral intuitions are unreliable and we must change or transform ourselves before we can become reliable judges of how to behave. This paper explores one version of that idea by focusing on *the moral experience*. The moral experience is a transformative experience which begins with vivid contemplation of others' mental lives—their joys, pains, sorrows, etc.—and then leads to a more demanding understanding of one's obligations to others. The opening sections of this paper draw on work by Josiah Royce in order to describe the moral experience in detail. I then argue that the existence of the moral experience should affect contemporary debates, illustrating my points with a discussion of the contemporary debate about global poverty.

06 Sandra Wawrytko (SDSU)

A Buddhist Critique of Metaphysical Coherence and its Social/Political Liabilities

Other than being an historical relic, does Coherence deserve to be a fundamental principle of any philosophy or is it an example of anthropocentric wish fulfillment? This is the question I would like to examine from the perspective of Buddhism's nondualistic

philosophy. The answer to this overarching question, however, requires an examination of several other points: (1) What is the core understanding of harmony as related to order in Chinese culture?; (2) How is the thirst for "harmonious" law and order manifested across cultures?; (3) What are the inherent liabilities of Coherence, past and present, in promoting authoritarian leadership?; (4) Does Buddhism offer a viable reality-based alternative to Coherence, grounded in leadership of the non-discriminating mind?

08 Joshua Butler (Loyola Marymount)

A Kuhnian Critique of Hume on Miracles: Miracles and Paradigm-Conflicting Scientific Anomalies

Hume's rejection of miracles has been attacked from many angles. Some have argued that his account does not align with a proper understanding of science. However, hardly anyone has brought Thomas Kuhn to bear on this topic. In this paper I show how what I call 'paradigm-conflicting scientific anomalies' are analogous to miracles in the relevant respects.

'Paradigm-conflicting scientific anomalies' cannot be explained by the current paradigm in much the same way as miracles cannot be explained by the laws of nature. Nevertheless, we are sometimes rationally justified in believing testimony in favor of this sort of anomaly. And because miracles are analogous to these anomalies in the relevant ways, we are sometimes justified in believing testimony in favor of miracles – understood as violations of the laws of nature.

09 Michael Cholbi (Cal Poly Pomona)

Esoteric Moral Theories

A moral theory T is esoteric if and only if T is true but there are some individuals who, by the lights of T itself, ought not *embrace* T, where to embrace T is to believe T and rely upon it in practical deliberation. Some philosophers hold that esotericism is a strong, perhaps even

decisive, reason, to reject a moral theory. However, proponents of this objection have often supposed its force is obvious and have said little to articulate it. I defend a version of this objection, namely, that, in light of the strongly first-personal epistemology of benefit and burden, esoteric theories fail to justify the allocation of benefits and burdens to which moral agents would be subject under their theories. Because of the holistic nature of moral theory justification, this conclusion in turn implies that the entirety of a moral theory must be open to public scrutiny in order for the theory to be justified. I conclude by answering several objections to my account of the esotericism objection.

11   Steven Barbone (SDSU)

Spinoza and Female Trouble
Spinoza says very little about women in his works, and what he says seems rather misogynist. Was Spinoza really a misogynist ? His metaphysics would seem to preclude it, yet his own words are explicitly clear. On this apparent blind spot in his philosophy, I propose reading Spinoza as a prophet insofar as what he says is but an imaginative product and as such, it has no philosophical truth while still relating some certain truth about the supposed relationship among (sic) genders.

12   Bob Dunton (IERG at Simon Fraser U.)

Dewey and Nietzsche on Morality and the Will to Power: Irreconcilably Different, or "Naturally" Allied?
I believe that Nietzsche's criticism of democratic principles and Dewey's lack of a convincing philosophical defense of the primacy of place that he gives to those same principles constitutes a barrier to meaningful dialogue between two communities each of which might benefit from the experiences of the other. I will briefly explore contemporary work in Nietzsche and Dewey studies that sheds light on perceived similarities and differences between their respective notions of 1) Morality, 2) Moral

Deliberation, and, 3) Growth and Power. My hope is to offer a friendly amendment to Professor Mark Johnson's assessment of Dewey's uniqueness.

Graduate Student Division:

13   Alex Misthos (SDSU)

A Reply to Quine
In this paper, I launch a defense of the analytic/synthetic distinction from the attacks that are launched upon it in Quine's *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*. Quine's attacks against the analytic/synthetic distinction are shown to be inadequate on the grounds that his conception of the distinction is fundamentally a misrepresentation of the true analytic/synthetic distinction. This misrepresentation is shown to be due to the fact that Quine is attacking the distinction as it is articulated by the logical positivists, who incorrectly reformulate the distinction in order to employ the term analyticity to refer to classes of beliefs which do not require verification in order to be considered meaningful. While Quine's attack does successfully undercut this logical positivist notion of the analytic/synthetic distinction, his failure to recognize a distinction between this account of the distinction and the true analytic/synthetic distinction as it was originally formulated by Kant leads him to throw the baby of the analytic/synthetic distinction out with the bath water of logical positivism.

14   Rena Goldstein (CSU L.A.)

Exercise as Process: You Can't Win for Losing
The distinction between sport and exercise is not widely theorized, especially to the end of evaluating societal values. I will argue a crucial difference between sport and exercise: the value of process in exercise versus the value of product in sport. I will first delineate between sport and exercise. In section II, I show how exercise is representative of process, while sport generally reduces to product. In other words, exercise demonstrates a process-oriented way of being,

whereas sport is a reflection of the societal convention of product-orientation. Lastly, I will conclude with the normative claim that society should value process (the attitude of exercise), and not product (sport); the value of process over product should be a principle in moral philosophy.

15   Brett Castellanos (Florida State)

Problems for Non-Volitional Accounts of Moral Responsibility: Core Akratic Actions and Irresistible Desires

Angela Smith has proposed an account of moral responsibility, which she calls the rational relations view (RRV). An agent is responsible for something just in case it reflects his or her rational capacities. In particular, Smith links responsibility to an agent's rational judgment. Further, an agent can still be responsible for some action without making any choice regarding that action. However, the RRV fails to account for the difference between akratic actions and those actions motivated by an irresistible desire. In this work, it is argued that agents can be responsible for akratic action but fail to be responsible in some cases when an action is motivated by an irresistible desire. Because the RRV requires that an agent's rational judgment is reflected in their actions, it neither accounts for an agent's responsibility for akratic actions nor his or her lack of responsibility because of irresistible desire.

16   Michael Fitzpatrick (Stanford)

Analysis, Synthesis and the Cartesian Gym

Descartes wrote proudly about developing a system of knowledge upon absolutely secure foundations. Yet the relationship of his system to the analytic and synthetic modes of presentation he deployed remains difficult to capture. I explore what Descartes was doing in writing the *Meditations* in the analytic style in order to show that Descartes has two separate and distinct projects going simultaneously in his writing. The first project was laying out his philosophical system of knowledge, God, the mind, and the nature of the world (Cartesian physics). The second project was producing a series of exercises (named the "Cartesian gym") for his readers which would transform them from naive minds into Cartesian knowers. Because these two projects are intertwined, they are easily taken to be one and the same, leading to the confusion that elements of Descartes' rhetorical strategy are aspects of his system. I make use of Spinoza's reconstruction of Descartes' system in the synthetic style to provide a powerful contrast to bring out the distinction between projects and to better understand why Descartes favored the analytic style. Finally, I use this distinction to understand and make less problematic two key issues in of Descartes interpretation: the role of the cogito in Descartes' philosophy, and the reason why his analytic arguments are *a priori* but his synthetic arguments are even more *a priori*.

17   Robert Siscoe (U. Arizona)

Contextualism Without Representation: A Response to the Meaning-Intention Problem

Stephen Schiffer has argued that the error theory put forth by contextualists, that speakers are unaware of the context-sensitivity of their knowledge attributing sentences, is not plausible on standard models of context-sensitivity. I call Schiffer's objection the "meaning-intention problem." In this paper, I contend that John Perry's model for context-sensitivity provides contextualists with the resources to resolve the meaning-intention problem. On Perry's view, there is a distinction between what utterances are about and what utterances concern. Within concerns-discourses, speakers may express propositions with their utterances that are true relative to contextually variable features even though speakers are not cognizant that such contextual qualification is necessary. A concerns-discourse of knowledge would thus be one in which it is possible that uses of knowledge attributing sentences are true relative to the epistemic standard of the context of utterance even though knowledge ascribers are ignorant of the relevant standard. I then consider

several objections that knowledge attributions cannot be understood as concerning epistemic standards and argue that none of these worries are cogent.

18   Andrew Lavin (UCLA)

Counterfactuals in Leibniz

Leibniz has what appears to be a problem. He both engages in counterfactual reasoning in his philosophical work— both freely and when forced by the thought experiments of colleagues—and holds to metaphysical convictions that are inconsistent with counterfactual reasoning which gets a grip on the actual world. Leibniz's radical holism leaves little room for the counterfactual reasoning in which he is wont to engage. I explore his solution to the problem by following his correspondence with Arnauld, concluding that while Leibniz's system is in fact incompatible with "local" counterfactual reasoning, a heuristic "essence-accident" distinction allows for some minimal counterfactual knowledge.

19   Stephen Bero (USC)

Responsibility and Our Self-Conceptions as Agents

In "Being in the World" Joseph Raz offers an account of responsibility according to which we can be responsible not only for successful exercises of our powers of agency, but also for failures of those powers. According to his account, this is because our self-conceptions as agents are threatened when our powers of agency fail, and we must take responsibility for these failures in order to address the threat. This means that we are responsible in a much broader range of cases than we might otherwise think.

I argue that Raz fails to explain how failures of our powers of agency could threaten our self-conceptions as agents in the particular manner he suggests. I consider several ways in which Raz's account might be supplemented or amended to fill this gap, and conclude that none of these strategies is promising. The flaw appears to be fatal to the account.

21   Meredith McFadden (UC Riverside)

Difficulties in the Relationship between Reasons and Values

We all share reasons to recognize or respect *what is valuable* in the world. These are agent neutral reasons. But there is also agreement that *valuing* influences the reasons you have, and that agents have particular reasons *to value*. These are agent-relative reasons. I argue that two core views of the relationship between reason and value (teleologists and buck-passers) have difficulty accounting for these two kinds of reasons. For both views, reasons and values can be read off one another, and this is what leads to the difficulty. Teleologists see reasons as a function of what is valuable, and for buck-passers, value is just a function of what agents have reason to do. I articulate the puzzles that arise out of these views of our evaluative agency and argue that though both views have difficulty, the buck-passer has an easier time accounting for the side of the puzzle they face.

22   Jason Schukraft (U. Texas-Austin)

Why Intuition Is Not Like Perception

Some metaphilosophers argue that the intuition that p does not confer prima facie justification on the belief that p. A common riposte to these attacks goes by way of analogy: intuition is analogous to perception; the perception that p confers prima facie justification on the belief that p; so the intuition that p does confer prima facie justification on the belief that p. Call this the innocence-by-association strategy. I contend that the intuition-perception analogy is misguided and that the innocence-by-association strategy fails. Although there are many respects in which intuition and perception are similar, the innocence-by-association strategy only succeeds if the features intuition and perception have in common are relevant, in the appropriate sense, to the intuition-perception analogy. I argue that the proposed similarities are either illusory or epistemically and dialectically irrelevant.

24 Julian Gonzalez (U. Kansas)

Scanlon's Misguidance in Rawls' Reflective Equilibrium
John Rawls' reflective equilibriums is interpreted in two ways by T.M. Scanlon. I will explain two criticisms that Scanlon address and responds to in the hope of showing possible flaws in supplied responses. For Rawls, the state of affairs of which we debate judgments and their conforming to principles where we ultimately come to a portrayal of the basis that can express "reasonable conditions" with principles that are in accordance with considered judgments is what he believes to be reflective equilibrium. Scanlon's process is comprised of too many evaluations to try to out maneuver what actually does occur. Reflective equilibrium is our principles and our considered judgments.

25 Taylor Cyr (UC Riverside)

Taking Hobart Seriously
Many contemporary compatibilists believe free will to be compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. Taking free will to be compatible with *in*determinism apparently subjects compatibilists to what is arguably the greatest challenge facing libertarian accounts of free will, namely the problem of luck. It is argued here, however, that this worry can be sidestepped by adopting an underrated brand of compatibilism, which I call "Hobart-compatibilism," named after R. E. Hobart, whose paper "Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It" is discussed here. On this account, an action is non-derivatively free only if the proximate causes of an agent's action deterministically cause her action. The advantages and disadvantages of this account are considered here, and a dilemma for compatibilists results.

Undergraduate Student Division:

26 James Johnson (UCLA)

William Ockham: Judicative Acts of Assent and Chatton's Conception of Truth
In this essay, I will present different strands of thought of the great fourteenth century nominalist, the Venerabilis Inceptor, William Ockham. First, I will present Ockham's distinction of judicative acts of assent: direct, reflexive. With this distinction in place I will argue that a counterintuitive implication is brought about by its bearing on the objects of belief and knowledge. Second, I will present Ockham's account of intuitive cognition. I will argue that here too a counterintuitive implication is brought about by its bearing on the objects of belief and knowledge. Finally, I will discuss a way by which one can avoid these implications by way of Walter Chatton's less restrictive conception of truth.

27 Carlos Flores (UC Santa Barbara)

Is 'Sex Reassignment Surgery' Medicine?
In this paper I defend the claim that medicine is the enterprise of restoring bodily faculties to their proper function and/or proactively preventing their dysfunction. I then go on to argue that, in light of this, sex reassignment surgery not only cannot be considered a medical procedure but is actually utterly contrary to the enterprise of medicine insofar as such a procedure is oriented towards the damaging of bodily faculties. I also canvass possible objections.

28 Austin Beltrand (UCLA)

A Neurological Account of Perceptual States
The following essay attempts to give a neurologically informed account of two dichotomous psychological states coined "absorption in experience" and "absorption in action" through a systematic exposition of their

features and the interrelation of these features. I first consider the nature of an internal clock if such a clock provides the basis for intuitions about temporal relations between periods of time. The paper then argues that the mere appearance of subjective time dilation results from variations in memory encoding between the two types of absorption. Next, the paper considers Hume's notoriously unclear concept vivacity by prying it into two parts - liveliness and crispness - and then attempting a reduction of the latter. Finally, I consider what factors modulate vivacity and tie the features together as to reveal the causal underpinnings of absorption.

29   Thomas Hicks (UCLA)

On the Priority of Substance in Thomistic Philosophy
This paper is an analysis of the Aristotelian/Thomistic understanding of the relationship between parts and wholes, and the difference between metaphysical and integral parts. It examines the nature of priority and the priority relationships between a material substance and its integral parts, and a material substance and its metaphysical parts, as well as the priority relationship between the four causes of being put forward by Aristotle and Aquinas. It also compares the Thomistic picture of composite substances with later scholastic and early modern philosophers, particularly Descartes.

30   Heather Stewart (U. Louisville)

Uncovering Gender in Hegel's "Ethical Order" in The Phenomenology of Spirit
In this paper, I examine the Spirit section of Hegel's text *The Phenomenology of Spirit,* and argue that this section of the text is a strong reflection of Hegel's essentialist views of gender, which I argue can also be found in other of Hegel's writings. I argue that the distinction that Hegel makes between "divine law" and "human law" is Hegel's way of not only articulating gender difference and the roles associated with each, but also in framing one as valued over the

other. Despite this view that is rather pessimistic for feminists who use Hegel's work, I argue that when read and interpreted in this way, Hegel's text offers a good starting point for critiques of gendered systems, and as such can still be useful for feminist scholars.

32   Jaycob Izsó (Portland State U.)

Between Marx and Foucault: Counter-Conduct and Emancipation
Foucault's now published lectures on *Security, Territory, Population* (2007) renewed an interest in a long-standing Foucauldian debate: the connection between the deployment of political power and the possibility of political emancipation. His notions of conduct and counter-conduct introduced a linkage between the power strategies of governmentality and his later work on the ethical domain in which we begin to understand ourselves as moral subjects. I believe it is within this notion of conducts that the last vestiges of Foucault's Marxism can be found. In his attempt to eschew a specific form of resistance or process of dissent, Foucault offers us a magnifying lens through which we can view a Marxian analysis of political emancipation. What we find is a manufactured, cancer-like, counter-conduct which develops inside the body of capitalist and, ultimately, neoliberal governmental practices.

33   Garry Soronio (UCLA)

Galileo Galilei's Copernicanism, Shift of Scientific Paradigm, and the Complementarity of Faith and Reason
In this paper, I will argue that Galileo champions for the compatible nature of science and religion, and his Copernicanism is a paradigmatic case for the complementarity of faith and reason; therefore the clash in the Galileo affairs is not religious but a scientific paradigm shift brought about by the heliocentric challenge to Aristotelian science. First, I will discuss Galileo's exposition of the complementary nature of faith and reason, and that Copernicanism is not a challenge to religion but

is a paradigmatic case of this harmony. In principle, religion and science are compatible, and Galileo sketched a series of hermeneutic principles for interpretation of Scriptures compatible with deliverances of science. Second, I will argue that not only in theory but as a matter of fact in the history of philosophy, Galileo's conflict is not essentially in religious doctrine, though the Roman Inquisition opened the case to clarify theological issues, and that the prosecution against him is due to non-religious but social and political factors. Finally, I will explain that his efforts for Copernicanism ignites the paradigm shift in science and motivates the disciplinary sanction against him.

35   Garry Soronio (UCLA)

Anselm's Doctrine of Freedom of the Will and the Angelic Fall

In this paper, I will give an explication of Anselm's doctrine of the freedom of the will that salvages both divine sovereignty and moral responsibility of creatures, within a classical theistic framework. In particular, I will explain how the Anselmian theory of free will makes sense of why the devil is ultimately at fault for his fall. First, I will give an exposition of Anselm's account of the will. Here, I will discuss the metaphysics of free will that reconciles divine sovereignty and real creaturely agency whereby the creature is the genuine source of his choices to be morally responsible. Real agency resides in the creature because self-initiation is brought about by God giving the creature alternative possibility, whereby moral responsibility is grounded due to the self-initiated acts of the creature. Then I will analyze its application to certain scenarios particularly the fall of the devil, and why the devil and not God is culpable for it. I will bring up Anselm's miser analogy in illustrating the workings of the devil's will which caused his fall. Finally, I will discuss an objection whereby the Lucifer was punished for his quiescence from willing justice for its own sake, and then I will explain Anselm's insight that responds to that the will as having being is good, but as having lost justice,

is evil. Injustice as the absence of justice is an instance of the privation theory of evil in keeping with his classical theism whereby only God and everything coming from Him exists.

36   James Johnson (UCLA)

### Zagzebski: Entitlement to Epistemic Trust

In this essay I will recount Linda Zagzebski's argument for the view that we have prima facie reason to believe what other people believe. In order to do this, I need, first, to give account of her conception of what trust and rationality amount to. Second, with these in place I can present her argument for the rationality of trusting in the reliability of one's own cognitive faculties. That one is rational in trusting the reliability of one's own cognitive faculties is essential to her argument that we are rational in trusting the beliefs of other persons. Third, Zagzebski's argument for the rationality of trusting other persons' beliefs will be presented. Finally, we will consider several of Elizabeth Fricker's objections to Zagzebski's argument for trust in others and find these objections wanting. This essay is meant primarily to be an exposition of Zagzebski's argument for prima facie trust in others.

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